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MPPAA WITHDRAWAL LIABILITY
ASSESSMENT: LETTING THE FOX
GUARD THE HENHOUSE
I. Introduction
In an attempt to remedy some of the defects in the private pension
system,' Congress unwittingly has created more problems than it has
solved. 2 The primary objective of the Multiemployer Pension Plan
Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA)3 "is to protect retirees and
workers who are participants in [multiemployer] plans against the
loss of their pensions." '4 In its attempt to achieve this objective,
Congress, through the MPPAA, has imposed significant new financial
obligations on employers who withdraw from multiemployer pension
plans (MEPPs).5 Specifically, some pension plan trustees, acting
under the authority of the provisions of the new amendments 6 which
calculate liability for withdrawal from multiemployer pension plans
(MEPPs), have demanded millions of dollars from withdrawing em-
1. See infra notes 41-84 and accompanying text.
2. Multiemployer Pension Plan Stabilization Act of 1981: Hearings on S.1748
Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1982) (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch,
Chairman of Committee on Labor and Human Resources) [hereinafter cited as
Stabilization Act].
3. See infra note 9.
4. H.R. REP. No. 869, Part 1, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2918, 2919.
5. A multiemployer pension plan is a defined benefit pension plan that is
maintained jointly by two or more unrelated employers, pursuant to one or more
collective bargaining agreements between one or more employee organizations and
more than one employer. 29 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(3) (1982); see Obrentz & Woodward,
ERISA-The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Tax Law &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 208, PRACTISING L. INST. II (June-July 1984)
[hereinafter cited as Obrentz & Woodward].
6. There are a variety of methods by which a plan may calculate the withdrawing
employer's liability. Specifically, the MPPAA prescribes four methods for calculating
withdrawal liability. 29 U.S.C. § 1391 (1982); see Washington Star Co. v. Inter-
national Typographical Union Negotiated Pension Plan, 729 F.2d 1502, 1505 (D.C.
Cir. 1984); see also Obrentz & Woodward, supra note 5, at 27-28. The four methods
prescribed by the MPPAA are: (1) the presumptive method, (2) the modified
presumptive or two-pool method, (3) the rolling-five or one-pool method, and (4)
the attributable method. Id. at 35-39. See generally Cummings & Kershaw, With-
drawal Liability Under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980,
40 N.Y.U. INST. ON TAX'N § 12.02[6] (ERISA Supp. 1982). Alternatively, the plan
may employ another method, subject to approval by the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC). 29 U.S.C. §§ 1302(b)(3), 1391 (1982).
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ployers. 7 These amounts may even exceed the employer's net worth.'
As a result, the MPPAA has engendered a tremendous volume of
litigation 9 and has been vigorously opposed by the private sector.10
7. See Two More Employers Challenge Imposition of Withdrawal Liability by
Teamsters Central States Fund, [July-Dec.] PENS. REP. (BNA), No. 357, at A-3,
A-4 (Aug. 31, 1981) (Teamsters Central States pension fund demands $8 million,
$16 million, and $2.2 million respectively from three employers alleged to have
withdrawn from fund).
8. See Shelter Framing Corp. v. Carpenters Pension Trust for S. Cal., 543
F. Supp. 1234, 1237 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (pension fund assessed employer's withdrawal
liability at 200% of employer's net assets), modified, 705 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3553 (1984); see also, Cahill, Pension Plan Penalty Arguments
Mount, N.Y. Daily News, Apr. 23, 1985, at K12, col. 3.
9. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) estimated that as of
March 10, 1983, 134 cases had been brought attacking the constitutionality of the
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendment Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94
Stat. 1208 (1980) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1461 (1982)) [hereinafter
cited as MPPAA], which amended the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1982) [hereinafter cited as ERISA]. See Hertz, Recent De-
velopments Under the Multi-Employer [sic] Pension Plan Amendment Act of 1980,
N.Y. ST. B. A. LAB. & EMP. L. NEWSLETTER 4 (Summer 1983). These constitutional
challenges, for the most part, have been rendered moot by the Supreme Court's
holding in PBGC v. R.A. Gray & Co., 104 S. Ct. 2709 (1984), superseded, Pub.
L. No. 98-369, § 558(a)(1), 98 Stat. 494, 899 (1984) (statute abolished retroactive
provision of MPPAA, which Court had previously held constitutional). Nevertheless,
attacks aimed at different facets of the MPPAA still are being brought. See Manor
Mines, Inc., 5 EBC (BNA) 1708 (1984) (Polak, Arb.); Ells, 5 EBC (BNA) 1161
(1984) (Zimrig, Arb.); Joy Mfg. Co., 5 EBC 1129 (BNA) (1984) (Hannan, Arb.);
Penn Textile Corp., 3 EBC (BNA) 1609 (1982) (Pritzker, Arb.).
10. E.g., Oversight of Private Pension Plans, 1983: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 273-310 (1983) (statement of Paul G. Bell, President, P.G. Bell
Co., General Contracting, Houston, Tex., on behalf of the Associated General
Contractors of America, accompanied by Dennis Bradshaw and Dan Knise, Staff
Members, Associated General Contractors of America); id. at 239-50 (statement of
Daniel F. McGinn, President, Dan McGinn & Associates, Anaheim, Calif.); id. at
250-76 (statement of Howard W. Ryder, President, Coastal Tank Lines, Akron,
Ohio, and Vice-Chairman, Board of Directors, American Trucking Associations,
Inc., accompanied by Herve Aitken, Director, Industrial Relations Department,
American Trucking Associations, Inc.) [hereinafter cited as Oversight]. The above
statements, in large part, represent employers' dissatisfaction with the MPPAA.
The workers covered by MEPPs are not pleased with the MPPAA either:
The workers that are covered by these plans are not happy with them.
Their disenchantment arises because too many of the benefit dollars that
are being paid by their employers are going toward payment of past
unfunded liabilities of the funds. Little is left to give present benefits
to the active workers. An actual example will illustrate why the employees
are frustrated.
The employer is engaged in the garment industry in the New York
City area. It pays from $175 to $275 by union contract to its employees.
It pays an amount equal to 20.5% of the gross weekly payroll to various
union funds for benefits, including approximately one-half of those pay-
MPPAA WITHDRAWAL LIABILITY
A MEPP is within one of the four categories of pension plans
in existence." This Note focuses on MEPPs. A MEPP is a plan in
which unions and employers, usually within a single industry, are
the sole participants. 2 Congress has provided for a system of with-
drawal liability 3 assessment which is to be invoked when an employer
decides to or is forced to leave a MEPP due to unfavorable economic
conditions.' Under this system the MEPP trustees," who usually
use overly conservative, if not unreasonable, assumptions, 6 assess
ments to retirement and health benefit plans that are at the international
level.
In this illustration, which is a real example, the workers whose hourly
labor is causing these various contributions by their employer, feel that
they are actually receiving very little present benefit. The employee being
paid $275 in direct wages is causing contributions of at least $37.50 per
week to be made to fund past obligations, at the international and local
level. Many employees have actually told the employer that they do not
want the [u]nion. The employer does not want the union either. However,
it cannot afford to become non-union. By doing so it will have been
considered to have withdrawn from the multiemployer pension fund and
it cannot afford to be assessed with the withdrawal liability.
It does not console the present workers to know that their work is
producing benefits for former workers. They feel they are part of a
chain letter. They see fellow workers drifting to other employers. And
they wonder who will be around to work for their employer so that
their benefits will be paid.
When MPPAA passed, no one told these workers that the money to
go to the fund to pay benefits for former workers would come at their
expense. Now that they see it is happening they do not like it.
The sense of frustration of the employer, and its employees, leads to
all sorts of alternatives. It encourages "double-breasted" shops by em-
ployers (but not to such a large extent that a partial withdrawal under
MPPAA would be triggered). It encourages acrimony between older union
members and leaders, who like the system because they are close to
retirement, and the younger employees and union leaders that want a
greater share of benefits from the employer now.
McCulloch, Special Report on MPPAA Arbitration, TOWNLEY & UPDIKE'S SPECIAL
LABOR REPORT SERIEs 8-10 (October 1985) (available from Townley & Updike, 405
Lexington Ave., New York, N.Y.) [hereinafter cited as McCulloch].
11. See infra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
12. See supra note 5.
13. Withdrawal liability is the amount an employer withdrawing from a MEPP
is assessed by the plan's trustees. It is a share of the plan's unfunded vested
benefits, which is an amount equal to the value of the nonforfeitable or vested
benefits (i.e., the future promised benefits) under the plan, less the value of the
plan's assets. 29 U.S.C. § 1393 (1982).
14. See supra note 6.
15. The board of trustees is comprised of one-half employer appointees and
one-half union appointees. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1982).
16. It is all too common to have the plan trustees arrive at a withdrawal liability
assessment based upon actuarial assumptions that are very conservative and in some
cases unreasonable. See Classic Coal Corp. v. UMW 1950 and 1974 Pension Plans,
5 EBC (BNA) 1449, 1465-66 (1984) (Nagle, Arb.) (actuarial assumptions relied on
by plan trustees utilized an extremely low rate of interest and a mortality rate
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the withdrawing employer's liability. 7 This method of assessment
often results in litigation between the withdrawing employer and the
trustees of the MEPP due to the natural antagonism between the
parties. I8
The assumptions' 9 embodied within the MPPAA cause withdrawal
liability litigation to be resolved against the departing party.2" These
projecting life expectancies of 100 to 110 years); McCulloch, supra note 10, at 4-
5.
17. Peick v. PBGC, 724 F.2d 1247, 1260 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 3554 (1984); see 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B) (1982); McCulloch, supra note 10,
at 3.
18. This antagonism has been described in a variety of ways:
A withdrawing employer "finds himself, without possibility of relief, in a boxing
ring from which he had been told he might be exempt, the prize being his own
money, in an uneven match, but assured by the referee that he would see to it
that it was a fair fight." Keith Fulton & Sons, Inc. v. New England Teamsters
and Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, Inc., 762 F.2d 1137, 1146 (1st Cir. 1985)
(Aldrich, Senior Cir. J., dissenting).
"In practice this assessment mechanism is something like letting Gimbel's de-
termine what sales tax Macy's has to charge its customers, with the proceeds going
to Gimbel's." McCulloch, supra note 10, at 4. For a further discussion, see id.
at 3-5.
Should those staying behind determine how much a withdrawing employer has
to pay? This scenario is akin to that of a poker game, where the losing players
"tell" the winning player when he can leave. Interview with Kenneth J. McCulloch,
Partner, Townley & Updike, in New York City (Aug. 16, 1985).
19. For purposes of any proceeding under the MPPAA, any determination which
relates to the calculation of withdrawal liability is presumed correct, unless the
party contesting the
determination shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the de-
termination was unreasonable or clearly erroneous.
(B) In the case of the determination of a plan's unfunded vested
benefits for a plan year, the determination is presumed correct
unless a party contesting the determination shows by a prepon-
derance of evidence that-
(i) the actuarial assumptions and methods used in the deter-
mination were, in the aggregate, unreasonable (taking into
account the experience of the plan and reasonable expec-
tations), or
(ii) the plan's actuary made a significant error in applying the
actuarial assumptions or methods.
29 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(3)(A)-(B) (1982).
Disputes over the determination of withdrawal liability are required to be reconciled
by means of arbitration. See infra note 165 and accompanying text. Pursuant to
a final judgment from an arbitrator, a federal district court (upon request by any
of the parties to the arbitration proceedings) reviewing the arbitrator's award must
presume the arbitrator's findings of fact to be correct unless they are rebutted by
a "clear preponderance of the evidence." 29 U.S.C. § 1401(c) (1982); see Obrentz
& Woodward, supra note 5, at 27-28, 65, 68.
20. Classic Coal Corp. v. UMW 1950 and 1974 Pension Plans, 5 EBC (BNA)
1449 (1984) (Nagle, Arb.); see Smith & Friedman, Act Helps Resolve Pension Plan
MPPAA WITHDRAWAL LIABILITY
assumptions greatly favor the remaining participants and place upon
the withdrawing employer the burden of proving the unreasonableness
of the withdrawal liability assessment.'
This Note proposes legislation which, if adopted, would cure the
withdrawal liability assessment problem associated with MEPPs 2
This Note will first discuss the history of pension plan development
in the United States with the focus being on MEPPs. 23 Then this
Note will consider the current system used to calculate withdrawal
liability from MEPPs.2 4 Finally, this Note suggests that Congress
establish a system whereby pension fund trustees would set forth
the components of a particular plan used in making a withdrawal
liability assessment and then grant insurance companies access to
this information, so they may bid competitively to guarantee the
departing employer's exposure to withdrawal liability.2 5
1I. The History of the Pension Plan in the United States
A. Categories of Plans
Private, defined benefit pension plans were established in the
United States in 1875.26 Today, there are four categories of private
pension plans: union plans, corporate plans, single-employer Taft-
Hartley plans, and multiemployer Taft-Hartley plans (MEPP).27 Union
plans which were sponsored exclusively by a union,2 8 were outlawed
by the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act). 9
Withdrawal Disputes, Legal Times, June 20, 1983, at 15, col. 3 [hereinafter cited
as Smith & Friedman]; supra note 238.
21. See supra note 19.
22. See infra notes 271-76 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 26-95 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 103-62 and accompanying text.
25. The presence of insurance companies will provide competition. The with-
drawing employer will be given a place to shop. Currently, the withdrawing em-
ployer's only resort is to a litigation system where he enters with the odds against
him. See supra notes 19, 22.
26. See Oversight, supra note 10, at 13 (statement of Dallas L. Salisbury,
Executive Director, Employee Benefit Research Institute).
27. P. HARBRECHT, PENSION FUNDS AND ECONOMIC POWER 43-45 (1959) [here-
inafter cited as HARBRECHT].
28. Id. at 45.
29. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, § 302(c), 61 Stat.
136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1982)) [hereinafter cited
as Taft-Hartley]. An employer is prohibited by Taft-Hartley from paying money
to a union unless the payments are held in trust and subject to joint administration.
29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1982). Any union plans in effect before the enactment of
Taft-Hartley are legal. Id. § 186(f) (1982).
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Union plans currently comprise less than ten percent of all private
pension plan funds."'
Corporate plans3 are established either through a collective bar-
gaining agreement with a union or through unilateral sponsorship
by the employer." The establishment of a corporate plan, pursuant
to a collective bargaining agreement, does not necessarily mean that
the union will have a voice in either the administration of the plan
or the investment of pension funds.33
Plans established pursuant to section 302(c)(5) of the Taft-Hartley
Act provide for union input into the administration and investment
of pension funds.14 Single-employer Taft-Hartley plans outnumber
multiemployer Taft-Hartley plans," although the latter are increasing
in importance.16
B. Multiemployer Pension Plans
MEPPs have been in existence for more than fifty years.37 Initially,
the responsibility for establishing and administering these plans rested
solely with the unions.38 The employer was required only to make
an agreed to per-hour contribution.3 9 Today, however, much more
is required of an employer. 40
30. M. COSTA, MASTER TRUST: SIMPLIFYING EMPLOYEE BENEFITS TRUST FUND
ADMINISTRATION 7 (1980).
31. For a discussion of corporate plans, see generally D. LOGUE, LEGISLATIVE
INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE PENSION PLANS 6 (1979).
32. P. HARBRECHT, supra note 27, at 43.
33. Id. at 43-44.
34. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1982). This section provides for the establishment
of trusts jointly administered by "representatives" of the employer and employees.
Id. The board of trustees in such a "Taft-Hartley plan" is comprised of one-half
employer appointees and one-half union appointees. See id.
35. Multiemployer plans covered 22076 of all private plan participants in 1980
and this percentage has been increasing. See A. MUNNELL, THE ECONOMICS OF
PRIVATE PENSIONS 219 (1982) [hereinafter cited as MUNNELL]. In 1950, only 9%
of private plan participants were covered by multiemployer plans. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. Although multiemployer plans have been increasing, the rate of increase
in pension plans generally is currently 8076, one-half of the historical pre-ERISA
rate. See Oversight, supra note 10, at 13, 16 (statement of Dallas L. Salisbury,
Executive Director, Employee Benefit Research Institute).
38. See Oversight, supra note 10, at 279 (statement of Paul G. Bell, President
P.G. Bell Co., General Contracting, Houston, Tex., on behalf of the Associated
General Contractors of America).
39. Id.
40. See infra notes 63-95, 103-62 and accompanying text; Note, The Multiem-
ployer Pension Plan Amendment Act of 1980: The Defeat of Employer Reliance




1. Multiemployer Plans Under Taft-Hartley
When Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, it included
a provision requiring the administration of a multiemployer pension
plan to be governed by a board consisting of an equal number of
management and labor trustees. 4' This provision was the "result of
concern over abuse and improper administration" of pension plans
by the unions.42 Despite the increased participation necessitated by
the Taft-Hartley Act, employers still have minimal, if any, involve-
ment with the administration of these plans.43 From an employer's
41. See supra notes 15, 29, 34 and accompanying text.
42. See Oversight, supra note 10, at 279 (statement of P.G. Bell, President,
P.G. Bell Co., General Contracting, Houston, Tex., on behalf of the Associated
General Contractors of America). See, e.g., Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S.
419, 425-26 (1959). The abuses feared included the use of funds "to perpetuate
control of union officers, for political purposes, or even for personal gain." Id.
at 426.
43. NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322 (1981) (Supreme Court held that
language and legislative history of 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) and ERISA demonstrate
that a pension fund trustee is a fiduciary whose duty to the fund's beneficiaries
must overcome any loyalty to the interest of the party that appointed him). The
duties required under these two statutes have been found to create an inherent
conflict.
A legal dispute between management and labor trustees of the big Western
Conference of Teamsters pension plan illustrates a troubling conflict
faced by multiemployer pension plan trustees under two federal statutes.
The plan's management trustees filed suit April 25[, 1985] in the Western
District of Washington ... alleging that the plan's union trustees breached
their fiduciary duty by blocking a proposed restructuring of the plan
designed to eliminate employers' withdrawal liability under the Multiem-
ployer Pension Plan Amendments of 1980. The suit alleges that the union
trustees initially proposed the disputed restructuring plan, only to reject
it later under coercion from Teamsters officials who feared that the
proposal would be detrimental to unions.
Pension practitioners noted that the case illustrates an inherent conflict
between multiemployer plan trustees' role as representatives of manage-
ment or labor interests under the Taft-Hartley Act and their fiduciary
duty to plan participants under ... ERISA. Multiemployer pension plans
established under § 302 of Taft-Hartley are administered jointly by trustees
appointed by participating unions and employers.
The management trustees' fiduciary claims are predicated on a 1981
case (NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322) in which the Supreme
Court held that Taft-Hartley plan trustees are not representatives of the
employers or unions that appointed them, but instead owe their primary
duty to plan participants in accordance with ERISA's fiduciary standards.
Legal questions surrounding Taft-Hartley trustees' conflicting duties have
become increasingly important in recent years as trustees have struggled
to reduce plans' unfunded liability under pressure from employers, who
face stiff penalties for withdrawing from underfunded plans under the
1980 multiemployer plan amendments.
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There is a need for clarification "of trustees' fiduciary duty under
those statutes," said Stephen E. Tallent of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
in Washington, D.C., counsel for the management trustees who filed the
suit. Tallent added that the case "may be a harbinger of whether these
multiemployer plans with all of their defects can work their way out of
trouble and make themselves attractive" to employers under the 1980
law.
Arthurs, Teamsters Pension Case Sparks Trustee Conflict, Legal Times, June 3,
1985, at 4, col. 1.
The union often has de facto control over the decisions of the board of trustees
of Taft-Hartley plans. Blodgett, Union Pension Fund Management, in ABUSE ON
WALL STREET: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE SECURITIES MARKETS 321-29 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Blodgett]; Pension Fund Investment Policies: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Citizens and Shareholders Rights and Remedies of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1978) (statement of Prof. Roy
Schotland); N. LEVIN, ERISA AND LABOR-MANAGEMENT BENEFIT FUNDS 226-27 (1975).
Where employers are fragmented, as often occurs in MEPPs, see Blodgett, supra,
at 330 (fears erosion of distinction between funds and unions), the union-appointed
trustees, voting as a bloc on the board of trustees, can influence the investment
policy by choosing an investment manager. Id; see McCulloch, supra note 10, at
3-4.
The courts give broad discretion to plan trustees to set benefit levels as they see
fit and will rarely, if ever, second guess the trustees' decisions. See Rosen v. Hotel
and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Union of Phila., Bucks, Montgomery,
and Delaware Counties, Pa., 637 F.2d 592 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 898
(1981); Seafarers Pension Plan v. Sturgis, 630 F.2d 218 (4th Cir. 1980); Aitken v.
IP & GCU-Employer Retirement Fund, 604 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979); Rehmar v.
Smith, 555 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1976).
The fact that these trustees are biased was stressed by Robert L. Wilkinson:
[Tihe delegation of authority to the trustees was to a biased group of
decisionmakers. One half of the trustees are union representatives who
can be expected to have little sympathy for withdrawing employers who
have gone non-union. The other half of the trustees are employer rep-
resentatives who frequently work for companies that are competitors of
the withdrawn employer. It is very likely that these employer trustees
will also have little sympathy for the withdrawn employer who will be
a non-union competitor with lower costs of doing business. The employer
representatives have an added incentive to maximize liability on a with-
drawn employer because every dollar that is collected from that employer
is one less dollar the company for which the trustee works will potentially
be liable for. In addition, many management trustees are former union
members who are entitled to pensions under the plan. As such, these
individuals will have a personal interest in seeing that as much withdrawal
liability is collected from a withdrawn employer as possible.
On top of all these biases, the trustees are ERISA fiduciaries who
have an obligation to act solely in the interest of plan participants and
beneficiaries and who are personally liable for the failure to do so. It
is likely that the trustees will interpret their fiduciary duty to require
maximization of withdrawal liability, thereby enhancing the abilities of
the plan to pay benefits to participants and beneficiaries.
Stabilization Act, supra note 2, at 305-06 (statement of Robert L. Wilkinson,
President of the Associated Specialty Contractors, Inc.); see id. at 333 (statement
of Howard Kraft, President of Climate Controls, Inc., of Phoenix, Ariz., on behalf
of the Associated Specialty Contractors, Inc.) ("The trustees of the management
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perspective, these Taft-Hartley plans were defined contribution plans44
since the only obligation of the employer was to make agreed upon
per-hour contributions. 5
In general, the Taft-Hartley Act furnished participants in the labor
relations field with a flexible framework for the administration of
pension plans.4 6 This result did not occur fortuitously; the stated
goal of the Taft-Hartley Act was to avoid industrial strife.4 7 The
Taft-Hartley Act also provided tax incentives for participating em-
ployers, which encouraged the growth and maintenance of MEPPs.4 8
plan are made up of management trustees, many of whom are past union members,
who have vested rights in a pension plan, so they are already biased in their
opinions."); id. at 57 (statement of James H. Hunt, President of Bangor Punta
Marine, Division of Bangor Punta Corporation).
For a further discussion of fiduciary duties under ERISA, see 29 U.S.C. §§
1101-14 (1982); Note, Fiduciary Standards and the Prudent Man Rule under the
Employment [sic] Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88 HARV. L. REV. 960
(1975).
44. A 1969 glossary of pension plan terms for internal use by the U.S. Dep't
of Labor defined "defined contribution plan" as: "A pension plan under which
the employer's contributions are fixed, e.g., a fixed amount for each hour worked
or a fixed percentage of compensation. Two types are money purchase plans and
collectively bargained multi-employer [sic] plans." OFFICE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT
AND PENSION REPORTS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, GLOSSARY-CORRESPONDENCE COURSE
ON PENSION PLANS (1969), quoted in W. Jett, Employer Contingent Liabilities Under
Union Pension Plans: ERISA Fact or Fiction, 27 LAB. L.J. 361, 363 (1976).
A more recent yet similar definition is as follows:
In a defined contribution plan, employer contributions are fixed year
after year, but yearly benefits for employees gyrate with the returns on
the pension investment portfolio. Harper & Row Publishers Inc. [for
example] has adopted such a plan for future retirees, funding it with
Harper & Row stock. That means that pension checks of an employee
now in his [twenties] will be determined by the performance of the stock.
The young worker does not have to wait to be vested, however, and
can carry his "portable pension" with him to a new job after only a
year or two at Harper & Row.
Williams, Raking in Billions From The Company Pension Plan, N.Y. Times, Nov.
3, 1985, § 3, at 8, col. 2 [hereinafter cited as Williams].
45. See Nachman Corp. v. PBGC, 592 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1979), aff'd on
statutory grounds, 446 U.S. 359, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 908 (1980); Oversight,
supra note 10, at 14 (statement of Dallas L. Salisbury, Executive Director, Employee
Benefit Research Institute); see also supra note 44.
46. Taft-Hartley, supra note 29; see Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation,
Multiemployer Study Required by Pub. L. No. 95-214, at 20 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as PBGC Study]. Under this statute Congress authorized the PBGC to prepare
a comprehensive report analyzing the MEPP situation. Pub. L. No. 95-214, 91
Stat. 1501 (1977).
47. The purpose of Taft-Hartley was to avoid industrial strife, which would be
minimized "if employers, employees, and labor organizations each recognize under
law one another's legitimate rights in their relations with each other ...... 29
U.S.C. § 141(b) (1982).
48. See PBGC Study, supra note 46, at 151, table 1.
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Given this environment, it is not surprising that multiemployer pen-
sion plans today are a primary component of many collective bar-
gaining agreements .4 9
Upon agreement between the employer and the union to establish
a pension plan and the requisite trust agreements, the parties engage
in a two-step process to fund the plan and to fix benefit levels.
The first step is to determine a fixed rate of employer contribution. 0
The second step is for the trustees to fix the benefit levels.'
Prior to the enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA)5 2 if a MEPP's funding level fell below the
requisite amount, there was nothing to prevent the trustees from
lowering the benefits. Thus, MEPP terminations were rare. 3 This
49. Courts have recognized pension benefits as mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining and thus have recognized the bargaining unit's right to strike for pension
funding. See Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
336 U.S. 960 (1949), aff'd, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (citing with approval Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950)); Williams, supra note 44, at 9, col. 1 ("The
pension plan is now, and always has been, an item for collective bargaining").
Thus, during the term of a labor agreement, an employer cannot install, alter or
terminate a pension plan for organized workers without the assent of a union. D.
McGILL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 27 (3d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited
as D. McGILL]; see, e.g., Wilson & Sons, 193 N.L.R.B. 350 (1971). The pension
benefits of retirees are not mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. Allied
Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
50. Examples of this rate are per hour of employment or per unit of production.
Davis, Mulliemployer Pension Plan Provisions in 1973, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Oct.
1974, at 10 [hereinafter cited as Davis].
51. J. MELONE, COLLECTIVELY BARGAINED MULTI-EMPLOYER [sic] PENSION PLANS
49, 91 (1963) [hereinafter cited as J. MELONE]. This computation is based primarily
upon actuarial estimates of future demands for benefits and upon forecasts of
income for the upcoming period. Some of the more salient actuarial estimates
utilized are: the level of contributions, mortality rates, employee turnover, retirement
age, salary scales, investment expenses and administrative costs. Id. at 76-87; F.
POMERANZ, G. RAMSEN & R. STEINBERG, PENSIONS, 23-24 (1976). Union efforts for
high benefit rates, see D. McGILL, supra note 49, at 97, may focus on the choice
of an actuary with a reputation for recommending high benefits. See J. MELONE,
supra, at 10; supra note 11. As a result, upon retirement an employee is entitled
to a benefit determined by the trustee's benefit formula. "Two basic types of
benefit formulas are predominant in multiemployer plans: benefit amounts vary
solely on the basis of service or they are uniform for all eligible retirees, regardless
of years of service." Davis, supra note 50, at 12. The degree to which the plans
mirror the actual expenses of the plan is greatly dependent upon the accuracy of
the actuarial estimates. J. MELONE, supra, at 51.
52. See ERISA, supra note 9.
53. See Connolly v. PBGC, 581 F.2d 729, 734 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 935 (1979); 126 CONG. REC. 12,179 (1980) (remarks of Rep. Biaggi indicate
that Congress viewed MEPPs as more stable and secure than single employer plans
and thus felt less need to insure the former). The trustees are no longer as free
[Vol. XIV
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was not the only recourse available to the trustees. An additional
solution, which could be used by itself or in conjunction with the
lowering of benefits, was to implement higher contribution rates
when the then current collective bargaining agreement terminated.14
In addition, the employer was relieved from any liability for failure
to provide promised benefits under the provisions of these pre-
ERISA MEPP trust agreements, which was perhaps the most im-
portant element of these agreements."
From the time of the Taft-Hartley Act's inception through the
mid-1960's, the number of MEPPs greatly increased, 6 as did the
reliance by employees on these plans as a primary source of retirement
income. 7 As a result, Congress began to consider regulation of
MEPPs."
The problem of MEPP termination was highlighted by the un-
fortunate consequences of the Studebaker shut-down. The 1964 shut-
down by Studebaker, Inc. of its operations in its South Bend, Indiana
automobile plant,5 9 was probably the most publicized incidence of
a substantial benefit loss. 60 While the Studebaker situation was prob-
to reduce benefits when the plan cannot support the benefits. PBGC Study, supra
note 46, at 4, 51-52.
54. See J. MELONE, supra note 51, at 51, 94; Davis, supra note 50, at 10.
55. J. MELONE, supra note 51, at 49; PBGC Study, supra note 46, at 2, 3;
see supra note 106.
56. Hearings on Private Pension Plans Before the Subcomm. on Fiscal Policy
of the Joint Economic Committee, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1267-68 (1966) (testimony
of W. Solenburger, Asst. Dir., Dep't of Soc. Security, Int'l Union United Auto,
Aerospace, & Agric. Implement Workers) [hereinafter cited as Private Pension];
Oversight, supra note 10, at 39.
57. Private Pension, supra note 56, at 1267-68.
58. Id.
59. Munnell, Guaranteeing Private Pension Benefits: A Potentially Expensive
Business, Tax Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 205, PRACTISING L.
INST. 249 (May-June 1984).
60. Inadequate funding left most of the 8500 Studebaker
employees with either reduced pensions or no pensions at all. Only those
employees age 60 or older with at least 10 years of service received full
benefits. Workers between age 50 and 59 with 10 years of service received
only 15 percent of their promised benefits and the remaining plant
employees received nothing.
Id.
In Congressional committee reports and debates, repeated references were made
to the loss of $49 million in pension benefits by 19,400 employees caused by the
closing of the Studebaker factory in Indiana, and to similar losses by employees
elsewhere. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1973), reprinted
in 1 LEG. HIST. 1085; H.R. REP. No. 799, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1974), reprinted
in 2 LEG. HIST. 2602; 120 CONG. REC. 29,194, 29,208, 29,213, 29,934-35, 29,949-
51, 29,952-54 (1974); see also Nachman Corp. v. PBGC, 592 F.2d 947 (7th Cir.
1979), aff'd on statutory grounds, 446 U.S. 359, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 908 (1980).
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ably the best known, it was not the only instance of a loss of
benefits due to inadequate funding. 61 These unfortunate mishaps
served as a catalyst for congressional interest in the area of pension
plan reform and regulation. 62
2. ERISA
In 1974, after ten years of numerous proposals, prolonged hearings,
and protracted debate, Congress enacted pension reform legislation
in the form of ERISA. 63 ERISA's two principal goals were "[tihe
growth and continuance of private pension plans and the security
of workers' pension benefits." ' 64 Thus, ERISA introduced funding
and vesting standards and imposed minimal restrictions on private
pension plans. 65 These standards were introduced to facilitate a
worker's legal claim to benefits. 66 However, the possiblity still re-
mained that some plans would terminate with insufficient assets to
cover their benefit commitments.67 Fortunately, however, Congress
anticipated such a contingency and enacted title IV of ERISA (Title
IV).68 Title IV softened the impact of insufficient assets by estab-
lishing the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), 69 which
61. See supra note 60.
62. See supra note 60.
63. See ERISA, supra note 9.
64. PBGC Study, supra note 46, at 48; see 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1982); see
also In re C.D. Moyer Co. Trust Fund, 441 F. Supp. 1128, 1131 (E.D. Pa. 1977),
aff'd, 582 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1978).
65. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1053 (minimum vesting standards), 1082 (minimum funding
standards) (1982).
66. PBGC v. R.A. Gray & Co., 104 S. Ct. 2709 (1984), superseded, Pub. L.
No. 98-369, § 558(a)(1), 98 Stat. 494, 899 (1984); Nachman Corp. v. PBGC, 446
U.S. 359, 361-62, 374-75 (1980); see Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S.
504, 510-11 (1981).
67. See PBGC Study, supra note 46, at 1, 138 (1978).
68. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1381 (1982) (Title IV establishes a system of termination
insurance).
69. 29 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982). The PBGC is part of the Department of Labor.
D. MCGILL, supra note 49, at 39. The Secretary of Labor is the chairman of the
board of the PBGC. Id. Other board members are the Secretary of the Treasury
and the Secretary of Commerce. Id. A seven-person advisory committee, appointed
by the President, represents management, labor, and the public's interest. Id.; see
Peick v. PBGC, 724 F.2d 1247, 1251 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3554
(1984).
A recent report on the status of the PBGC was anything but complimentary:
Many corporate pension funds may be overflowing, but it is the worst
of times for the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, the federal agency
that insures and regulates private pension plans. The agency is itself
woefully underfunded, buried under liabilities that exceed its assets by
approximately $1 billion.
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provided funds in the event a deficiency existed in the fund's assets
upon termination of a plan. 7" The PBGC was also empowered to
bring a cause of action against employers who failed to fulfill their
share of contributions. 7'
The PBGC's obligation to pay benefits for MEPPs, which was
generally greater in size and scope than it was in single employer
plans, was not to become mandatory until January 1, 1978.72 During
the intervening period, the decision whether to pay benefits upon
termination of a MEPP was left solely to the discretion of the
PBGC.73 If an employer withdrew from a MEPP, it was subject to
contingent liability for a share of the unfunded vested benefits.7 4
The agency's condition is a direct result of the financial woes of basic
industries over the last few years. Despite the plentitude of pension assets
at most companies, there are still several large corporations that are
pitifully underfunded. Some of the country's largest corporations, in-
cluding Pan Am, American Motors, Chrysler, Bethlehem Steel and General
Motors have unfunded pension liabilities in excess of $100 million.
The agency's situation became critical [in October of 1985] . . .when
Wheeling-Pittsburgh, an ailing steelmaker in reorganization under Chapter
11, terminated its plan, leaving the agency to pay $475 million in unfunded
liabilities. Weeks earlier, Allis-Chalmers, the financially battered farm
machinery maker, terminated its plan for hardship reasons and saddled
the pension insurers with $165 million in unfunded claims.
These laggards have pushed the Federal agency into the red, and
guarantors are begging Congress for corrective revenue-raising legislation
to erase the agency's deficit. The agency raises funds by collecting
premiums to insure private pension plans. Now it wants to raise rates
more than threefold, to $8.10 per employee per year from $2.60.
Meanwhile, the agency got some good news [in late October of 1985]
.. International Harvester, one of the most beleagured victims of the
strong dollar and the agricultural recession, announced that it would be
able to cut its unfunded liabilities by $500 million, to about $400 million.
Harvester is borrowing the money from its finance subsidiary.
Williams, supra note 44 at 8, col. 5.
70. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1322 (1982).
71. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1303(e), 1368 (1982).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 1381(c)(2)-(4) (1976); see PBGC v. R.A. Gray & Co., 104 S.
Ct. 2709, 2713 (1984), superseded, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 558(a)(1), 98 Stat. 494,
899 (1984); Peick v. PBGC, 724 F.2d 1247, 1252 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 3554 (1984).
73. See supra note 72.
74. An employee's right to receive a present or future benefit vests when that
right to eventually receive the benefit is no longer contingent on remaining in the
service of the employer. Peick v. PBGC, 539 F. Supp. 1025, 1030 (N.D. 111. 1982),
aff'd, 724 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3554 (1984); S &
M Paving, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 539 F. Supp. 867, 868
(C.D. Cal. 1982) ("Under ERISA-sponsored [MEPPs], the pension benefits an
employee could receive were not directly tied to the actual contributions made by
his employer. Thus, the funds held in trust by each plan did not always equal the
amount of vested pension benefits that had accrued and were outstanding. [This]
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Congress chose not to insure MEPPs immediately for two reasons:
(1) MEPPs were viewed as more stable and secure than their single
employer counterparts;7" and (2) the cost factor of such a program
was prohibitive. 76 Unfortunately, however, as January 1, 1978 ap-
proached, the date on which the PBGC would become obligated to
fund MEPPs which had terminated with insufficient assets, Congress
realized that MEPPs were not as stable as it initially thought.77
Congress, confronted with this situation, postponed the effective date
to July 1, 19798 and ordered the PBGC to prepare a study of the
MEPP situation. 9 The PBGC's discretionary authority was later
extended to May 1, 1980,80 July 1,1980,81 and then finally to August
1, 1980.82 On each occassion, Congress made the postponement to
difference [is the unfunded vested liability]."); see infra note 91 and accompanying
text. This contingent liability was dependent upon the plan's termination within
the next five years, and the PBGC's decision to pay guaranteed benefits. Peick,
539 F. Supp. at 1030. Maximum employer liability was limited to 3007o of the net
worth which would be payable to the PBGC. 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b)(2) (1982).
75. Peick v. PBGC, 539 F. Supp. 1025, 1030-33 (N.D. III. 1982) (citing Connolly
v. PBGC, 581 F.2d. 729, 734 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 935 (1979)),
aff'd, 724 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3554 (1984).
76. Peick v. PBGC, 539 F. Supp. 1025, 1031 (N.D. 111. 1982), aff'd, 724 F.2d
1247 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3554 (1984).
77. For example, in late 1977, Senator Javits, who co-authored ERISA, see
Oversight, supra note 10, at 315, admonished his fellow Senators that he knew of
several MEPPs that intended to terminate in the new year, "thereby shifting possibly
hundreds of millions of dollars of liability to the PBGC insurance system." 126
CONG. REC. Si0,099 (daily ed. July 29, 1980) (statement of Sen. Jacob J. Javits).
78. Pub. L. No. 95-214, 91 Stat. 1501 (1977).
79. Id. The study by the PBGC underscored the potential difficulties that MEPPs
would be subject to, given the current state of the law. PBGC Study, supra note
46, at 51. The study reported on approximately 2000 covered MEPPs which were
comprised of about 8 million participants. Id. at 52-53. Approximately 10% of
these plans, representing close to 1,300,000 participants were in dire financial straights
which could foreseeably result in plan terminations by 1988. Id. at 1, 138. The
study indicated that once the PBGC became obligated to guarantee benefits under
MEPP terminations, these terminations could necessitate the PBGC having to raise
its per capita premium from fifty cents to as much as nine dollars. Id. at 2, 16,
140. In addition, R. Marshall, Secretary of Labor and Chairman of the Board,
PBGC, told Congress that the current ERISA provisions had the effect of and
were in fact encouraging employers to withdraw from MEPPs. Hearings on the
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendment Act of 1979, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 361
(1980) (testimony of R. Marshall, Secretary of Labor, and Chmn. of the Bd.,
PBGC). Congressional testimony by Matthew M. Lind, the Executive Director of
the PBGC, was in accord with that of R. Marshall. Pension Plan Termination
Insurance Issues: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm.
on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1978) (statement of Matthew M.
Lind, Exec. Dir. of the PBGC).
80. Pub. L. No. 96-24, 93 Stat. 70 (1979).
81. Pub. L. No. 96-239, 94 Stat. 341 (1980).
82. Pub. L. No. 96-293, 94 Stat. 610 (1980).
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provide time for thorough consideration of the complex issues posed
by the termination of MEPPs83
3. MPPAA
In response to the problems revealed in the study, Congress passed
the MPPAA.84 The MPPAA's implementation was delayed several
times." Rep. Carl D. Perkins, then chairman of the House Labor
Committee, was empowered to insist that there be no further delays
on the enactment of the MPPAA.86 He provided Congress with an
ultimatum: either pass the MPPAA "as is" or forget about passing
the MPPAA at all. 87
When the MPPAA was enacted on September 26, 1980, it was
made retroactive to April 29, 1980,88 to alleviate fears that some
83. PBGC v. R.A. Gray & Co., 104 S. Ct. 2709, 2715 & n.1 (1984), superseded,
Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 558(a)(1), 98 Stat. 494, 899 (1984).
84. The House of Representatives passed the MPPAA by a unanimous vote.
126 CONG. REC. H4170 (daily ed. May 22, 1980). The Senate voted in favor of
the MPPAA by a count of 85 to 1. Id. at SIO,169. Differences between the House
and, Senate versions were eventually reconciled in September of 1980. The House
repassed its version 363-0 on August 26, 1980, 126 CONG. REC. H7909 (daily ed.),
and the Senate approved a slightly different bill the same day. Id. at S1I,676 (daily
ed.). A conference followed, with the Senate and House agreeing to the Conference
Committee report on September 18th and 19th respectively. Id. at S12,901 (daily
ed.); id. at H9180 (daily ed.) (vote of 324-1). The legislation was signed into law
by President Carter on September 26, 1980. Multiemployer Pension Plan Amend-
ments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208 (1980).
85. See supra notes 78-82.
86. Interview with Charles T. Carroll, Jr., Counsel, Subcomm. on Labor, in
Washington, D.C. (January 9, 1985).
87. In .effect this was a form of "legislative blackmail." See Stabilization Act,
supra note 2, at 263-64 (statement of Robert A. Georgine, Chmn., National
Coordinating Committee for Multiemployer Plans) (the MPPAA was "the product
of extraordinary efforts and painful compromise. Four Congressional committees
worked intensively for more than two years. The compromise was developed out
of substantial give and take by [all the parties involved] .... [Tlhe 1980 law was
one of the most difficult legislative products undertaken by the Congress in recent
memory."); id. at 332 (statement of Richard Hall on behalf of the Associated
General Contractors of America) (in regard to the MPPAA: "we were faced with
the alternative of taking the compromise which was reached-but not very happily
agreed to by anybody-or going back to the 1974 act, [ERISA] as has been
interpreted by the courts in 1978, which was the real fatal blow .... ").
Charles T. Carroll in stressing the need for reform in this area used colloquial
terms to describe the situation employers found themselves in after the implemen-
tation of the MPPAA: "There is a great need to relieve employers who have been
dragooned into this blunderbuss approach regarding withdrawal liability." Interview
with Charles T. Carroll, Jr., Counsel, Subcomm. on Labor, in Washington, D.C.
(January 9, 1985).
88. 29 U.S.C. § 1461(e) (1982). This provision was held constitutional in PBGC
v. R.A. Gray & Co., 104 S. Ct. 2709 (1984), superseded, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §
558(a)(1), 98 Stat. 494, 899 (1984); see supra note 9.
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employers might escape from their plans before the MPPAA became
effective. s9 The MPPAA requires that an employer withdrawing from
a MEPP pay a "fixed and certain debt" to the pension plan9'° This
withdrawal liability is the employer's proportionate share of the
plan's unfunded vested benefits-the difference between the present
value of vested benefits and the current value of the plan's assets.9 '
Thus, the MPPAA eliminated the contingent and limited aspects of
multiemployer liability.
Unfortunately, the MPPAA encompasses many complex issues
involving labor, tax, and insurance. 92 As a result, many major
industries did not take a position because of the confusion resulting
from the complexity of the law. 93 The construction and entertainment
industries, however, became actively involved and received somewhat
more favorable treatment.94 In light of this background, it is not
surprising that the application of the withdrawal liability assessment
system often subjects employers to unfair, unequal treatment and
harsh results.95
III. The Current Status of MEPPs
Approximately one-half of the labor force participates 96 in private
89. One Senator noted, that the retroactive effective date was designed to prevent
"the withdrawal of ... opportunistic employers without imposition of liability"
and was to also serve "as a deterrent to hasty employer withdrawal." 126 CONG.
REC. S10,156 (daily ed. July 29, 1980) (statement of Sen. Matsunaga).
90. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1362-1364, 1381 (1982).
91. The term "unfunded vested benefits" is defined as "an amount equal to-
the value of nonforfeitable benefits under the plan, less the value of the assets of
the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1393(c) (1982); see 29 U.S.C. § 1381 (1982).
Unfunded vested liability may be created: (1) when the employer's contributions
are set by collective bargaining, independent of benefits prescribed by the fund's
trustees; (2) when ERISA has increased an employer's liability for a pension fund
that was enacted before ERISA with less stringent funding provisions; (3) when
there is an increase in benefits for past work, and no contributions have been
made for that work; (4) when fund assets diminish as a result of market forces;
or (5) when actuarial assumptions have to be modified. Republic Indus. v. Teamsters
Joint Council No. 83 Pension Fund, 718 F.2d 628, 632 n.2 (4th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 3553 (1984); see supra note 74.
92. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1461 (1982).
93. See, e.g., Stabilization Act, supra note 2, at 170 (statement of Jerry Freirich
on behalf of the National Meat Association) ("In point of fact, only a handful
of people participated in developing the law .... Few people are expert enough
to understand that the Bill had an unintended impact on the business community.").
94. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1383(c) (1982) (entertainment industry).
95. See supra notes 172-255 and accompanying text.
96. Department of Labor, Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 1978
Report to Congress 53.
97. Lynn, Private Pensions in Perspective: Problems of the Years Ahead, 15
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pension plans subject to ERISA's coverage. 97 Specifically, these plans
cover 50 million workers and 10 million beneficiaries. 8 A 1982 study
revealed that there were approximately 745,000 private employer-
sponsored plans in the United States. 99 Private pension funds' hold-
ings were vast. One forecast predicted a growth of total assets of
private plans from the 1982 amount of over $624 billion'x' to $3
trillion by 1995.101 In addition, the resources of these private pension
plans are concentrated; approximately eighty percent of all pension
funds in the corporate sector- are comprised of some 1600 large
corporations. 12
GA. L. REV. 269, 277 (1981). Private pensions cover 96076 of the workers in firms
of 500 or more workers, 7807o of the jobs in firms of between 100 and 500 workers,
and 46% of the jobs in firms of under 100 workers. [July-Dec.] PENS. REP. (BNA)
No. 315, at A-17 (Nov. 3, 1980) (statement by Thomas S. Boyd, Jr., Legislative
Advisor on Employee Relations, Mobil Oil Company).
98. See Oversight, supra note 10, at 323 (statement of Hon. Jacob K. Javits).
99. See Oversight, supra note 10, at 7, 40, table 3 (statement of Dallas L.
Salisbury, Executive Director, Employee Benefit Research Institute).
100. Oversight, supra note 10, at 323 (statement of Hon. Jacob K. Javits).
101. Kaiser, Labor's New Weapon: Pension Fund Leverage, Can Labor Legally
Beat Its Plowshares Into Swords?, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 409 (1982); Lanoff, The
Social Investment of Private Pension Plan Assets: May It Be Done Lawfully Under
ERISA?, 31 LAB. L.J. 387 (1980).
Another forecast estimated that as of 1985 corporate and public pension plans
had total assets of approximately $1.3 trillion dollars and owned more than 25076
of all publicly traded stock. McCarroll, Socially Responsible Investment of Public
Pension Funds: The South Africa Issue and State Law, 10 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. &
Soc. CHANGE 407 (1980); see Klein, Investments for Pension Funds, 42 N.Y.U.
INST. ON FED. TAX. § 23 (1984).
102. 10 [Jan.-June] PENS. REP. (BNA) No. 427, at 95 (Jan. 17, 1983). Ap-
proximately 192,000 of these plans are defined benefit plans and over 545,000 are
defined contribution plans. Oversight, supra note 10, at 14 (statement of Dallas
L. Salisbury, Executive Director, Employee Benefit Research Institute). A 1969
glossary of pension plan terms published by the U.S. Dep't of Labor for internal
use defined "defined benefit" plan as: "[a] pension plan which provides a definite
schedule of benefits. The employer's contributions under such a plan are determined
actuarially on a basis of the benefits expected to become payable." OFFICE OF
LABOR-MANAGEMENT AND PENSION REPORTS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, GLOSSARY-
CORRESPONDENCE COURSE ON PENSION PLANS (1969), quoted in W. Jett, Employer
Contingent Liabilities Under Union Pension Plans: ERISA Fact or Fiction, 27 LAB.
L.J. 361, 362 (1976).
A "defined contribution" plan is defined as: "[a] pension plan under which the
employer's contributions are fixed, e.g., a fixed amount for each hour worked or
a percentage of compensation." Id. at 363.
Ninety-eight percent of defined benefit plans are single employer, while the
remaining two percent are multiemployer. Oversight, supra note 10, at 14 (statement
of Dallas L. Salisbury, Executive Director, Employee Benefit Research Institute).
Employer sponsored defined contribution plans are nine and nine-tenths percent
single employer and one-tenth percent multiemployer plans. Id. There are approx-
imately 3600 [sic] multiemployer defined benefit plans in existence. Id.; see 29
U.S.C. § 1002(34)-(35) (1982).
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IV. Sources of Multiemployer Liability
Businesses today are constantly undergoing or responding to
changes." 3 This may have an effect on the company's pension plan.
There are several potential sources from which, as a result of a
business change, an employer's liability may arise."'1
A. Liability Under the Pension Plan Agreement
To ascertain the nature and scope of an employer's liability under
the pension plan agreement, the pension plan agreement itself must
be considered. A pension plan is a special type of contract between
an employer and its employees." 5 An employer's liability under these
agreements is usually minimal because the employer includes a dis-
claimer provision. 0 6 The disclaimer provision absolves the employer
from the obligation to make future contributions in the event the
plan is terminated, and reserves in the employer the right to terminate
the plan at will." 7 In addition, an employee's right to a vested
benefit is limited to the amount accrued as of the termination date.
This amount is payable only if the benefit is funded by such date. 08
103. Some of the more significant changes are mergers, reorganizations, plant
shutdowns, plant slowdowns, deregulation, capital asset sales, union decertifications,
and in the most extreme cases involuntary and voluntary cessation of business.
Stabilization Act, supra note 2, at 67-68 (statements of Howard W. Ryder, President,
Coastal Tank Lines, Inc., Vice-Chmn. of the Bd. of the American Trucking
Association; Hugh C. Shurtleff, President T.I.M.E.-D.C.; David W. Howell, Chmn.
of the Willet Companies).
104. See infra notes 105-71 and accompanying text. It must be emphasized before
analyzing these sources separately that these sources' effects must be considered in
conjunction with one another in order to form a proper conclusion as to the
business change's effect. Interview with Kenneth J. McCulloch, Partner, Townley
& Updike, in New York City (Aug. 16, 1985).
105. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 1-5, at 11-12 (2d ed. 1977).
106. An example of such a disavowal was present in the Nachman case:
Benefits provided for herein shall be only such benefits as can be provided
by the assets of the Fund. In the event of termination of th[e] Plan,
there shall be no liability or obligation on the part of the company to
make any further contribution to the Trustee except such contributions,
if any, as on the effective date of such termination, may then be accrued
but unpaid.
Nachman Corp. v. PBGC, 592 F.2d 947, 950 (7th Cir. 1979), aff'd on statutory
grounds, 446 U.S. 359, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 908 (1980).
107. See, e.g., id.
108. Interview with Kenneth J. McCulloch, Partner, Townley & Updike, in New
York City (Aug. 16, 1985). Moreover the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) does not
inhibit an employer from so structuring the pension plan agreement. I.R.C. §
411(d)(3) (1985). Therefore, absent provisions more stringent than in the normal
case, the pension plan agreement is not a source of great employer liability.
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B. Liability Under the Collective Bargaining Agreement
The collective bargaining agreement also needs to be scrutinized.
Specifically, such agreement may contain a separate provision pro-
viding for the continuance of contributions even if the employer
terminates the plan.'0 9 If such a provision is present, termination of
the plan could result in contractual liability for the employer even
though the pension plan agreement provides for termination at will,
without liability.'"'
C. Liability on the Basis of the Employer's Promise Under the
MEPP
MEPP statutory liability under Title IV applies only to defined
benefit plans. ' ' ' This liability does not apply to defined contribution
plans because of the difference in legal obligations under these two
types of plans. ' 2
Under a defined contribution pension plan, an employer's con-
tributions are determined with respect to specific individuals." 3 These
contributions usually take the form of either a fixed plan, such as
a stock sharing plan or, more commonly, a discretionary contribution
plan."4 The benefits available upon retirement are based on the
value of the contributions allocated to the employee's account." 5
The employee is not entitled to a specific amount of benefits." 6
Unless the employer has made a specific agreement to the contrary,
his obligation to contribute ends when the plan terminates." 7 As a
result, the employee bears the risk of poor investment performance
by the trustees. '"8
Conversely, under a defined benefit pension plan, an employee
becomes entitled to a specific determinable pension benefit."19 This
109. Interview with Kenneth J. McCulloch, Partner, Townley & Updike, in New
York City (Aug. 16, 1985).
110. Id.
Il1. 29 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (1982); see supra notes 130-71 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 102.
113. Oversight, supra note 10, at 14 (statement of Dallas L. Salisbury, Executive
Director, Employee Benefit Research Institute).
114. Id. at 15.
115. Id. at 14.
116. Id. at 14-15.
117. Id. at 14-15; Interview with Kenneth J. McCulloch, Partner, Townley &
Updike, in New York City (Aug. 16, 1985); see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(34)-(35) (1982).
118. Oversight, supra note 10, at 15 (statement of Dallas L. Salisbury, Executive
Director, Employee Benefit Research Institute).
119. Id. at 14. ERISA mandates that a plan contain definitely determinable
benefits. Prior to ERISA, for example, if a plan did not provide for vesting of
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benefit is usually based on factors such as age, years of service,
and salary.'2" While the benefit is certain, the method in which it
is funded is not.' Both ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code
(IRC) 22 contain requirements regarding minimum funding standards
for defined benefit plans.' 3 In the usual case, actuarial assumptions
are relied upon to determine the employer's yearly contributions.'24
A great degree of latitude is given to these actuarial computations. 2"
Upon termination of a defined benefit plan, two rights come into
direct conflict with one another. Specifically, the employer usually
has reserved the right to terminate the plan at will.' 26 Under a defined
benefit plan, however, the employer also has promised the employee
benefits, some of which have vested.'27 A problem arises when the
employee's vested benefit has not been fully funded. Title IV resolves
this problem. One of the two principal goals of ERISA is to provide
security for the worker's pension benefits. 2 8 Thus, when an employer
is involved with such a plan, Congress has provided statutory liability
to ensure that the employee receives his vested benefits, 2 9 regardless
of whether the pension plan agreement provides otherwise.
D. Liability Under ERISA as Refined by Title IV
Initially, it is important to distinguish two plans which resemble
MEPPs but do not qualify as MEPPs under Title IV. The first type
of non-MEPP, whereby employers contribute to a fund that is not
subject to any collective bargaining agreement, 3" is a single employer
benefits until retirement, an employee with 30 years of service could lose all pension
benefits if his employment were terminated before retirement. Nachman Corp. v.
PBGC, 592 F.2d 947, 951 (7th Cir. 1979), aff'd on statutory grounds, 446 U.S.
359 (1980).
120. Berin, Unfunded Liabilities and Private Pension Costs in the United States,
BENEFITS INT'L, April 1979, at 14, 19 (describing actuarial assumptions used in
calculating pension fund liabilities); see supra notes 16, 51 and accompanying text.
121. Oversight, supra note 10, at 14 (statement of Dallas L. Salisbury, Executive
Director, Employee Benefit Research Institute).
122. I.R.C. (Internal Revenue Code of 1954 codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.
§§ 1-9602 (1982)).
123. I.R.C. § 412 (1985); 29 U.S.C §§ 1081-1086 (1982).
124. E.g., Classic Coal Corp. v. UMW 1950 and 1974 Pension Plans, 5 EBC
(BNA) 1449, 1453-54 (1984) (Nagle, Arb.).
125. E.g., Ells, 5 EBC (BNA) 1161, 1175-76 (1984) (Zimring, Arb.).
126. Interview with Kenneth J. McCulloch, Partner, Townley & Updike, in New
York City (Aug. 16, 1985).
127. See supra notes 74, 91.
128. See supra note 64.
129. See supra notes 65-66.
130. See 29 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(3)(B) (1982) (presence of a collective bargaining
agreement is part of the MEPP definition).
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plan. The second type of non-MEPP is a plan where the contributing
employers are all under the common control of a corporation, 3' as
with a parent-subsidiary pension plan. Members of such a plan
would be treated as a single employer under Title IV."'
A MEPP, by contrast, is "a plan to which more than one employer
is required to contribute," and "which is maintained pursuant to one
or more collective bargaining agreements between one or more em-
ployee organizations and more than one employer."' 33 As a result
of the enactment of Title IV via the MPPAA, employers who are
members of MEPPs became subject to a new set of rules regarding
employer liability. 13 4
1. MEPP Liability Triggered as a Result of Business Changes
Termination of a MEPP is not likely, given the fact that more
than one employer contributes to the plan. An employer is more
likely to become liable when he has "withdrawn."' 35 An employer
can withdraw either completely3 6 or partially.3 7 Under what is known
as the "de minimus rule," however, an employer is exempt from
paying withdrawal liability if he owes an amount less than three-
quarters of one percent of the plan's unfunded vested obligations,
or $50,000.18
a. Complete Withdrawal
A complete withdrawal occurs when an employer either perma-
nently ceases to have an obligation to contribute under the plan or
permanently ceases all operations covered under the plan. 39 Thus,
131. 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(l) (1982).
132. 29 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(2), (b)(l) (1982).
133. 29 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(3) (1982).
134. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1453 (1982).
135. 29 U.S.C. § 1381(a) (1982).
136. 29 U.S.C. § 1383(a) (1982).
137. 29 U.S.C. § 1385(a) (1982). Any one of the aforementioned business changes,
see supra note 103, may fall within the penumbra of either a complete or partial
withdrawal and thus trigger employer liability. See infra notes 139-50 and accom-
panying text.
138. 29 U.S.C. § 1389(a)(2); H.R. REp. No. 869, Part 1, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
76, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2944.
139. 29 U.S.C. § 1383(a) (1982). Given the unique nature of certain industries,
special rules apply to them. These unique industries frequently work on a project-
by-project basis rather than the usual day-in, day-out type of operation. A problem
occurs when the project is completed. Under the general rules, an employer would
be considered as having completely withdrawn even though the project was known
to be temporary from the start. The assessment of withdrawal liability in such a
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the type of business change that produces the complete withdrawal
is irrelevant under the MPPAA. It is also irrelevant under the
MPPAA whether the complete withdrawal has been caused by only
one or by more than one business change.140
A complete withdrawal, however, does not occur simply because
an employer ceases to exist, whether via a change in corporate form
or a transformation into an unincorporated form,' 4' provided that
the change does not alter the employer's contribution or its obligation
to contribute. 42 Furthermore, an employer who suspends contri-
butions during a strike or other labor dispute is not deemed to have
completely withdrawn. 143
b. Partial Withdrawal
An employer may also incur withdrawal liability if it partially
withdraws from the plan. Title IV partial withdrawal liability can
be triggered on the last day of a plan year if there is: (1) a seventy
percent contribution decline; 44 (2) a cessation of an obligation to
situation would in essence be an assessment on a "phantom withdrawal." As a
result, Congress enacted special rules for the building and construction, entertain-
ment, and the long and short-haul trucking industries. 29 U.S.C. § 1383(b)-(d)
(1982). Moreover, plans in other industries are permitted, with the approval of the
PBGC, to adopt withdrawal liability rules similar to those that apply to the
aforementioned industries. 29 U.S.C. § 1383(f) (1982).
Unfortunately, not all of these special rules have achieved their intended effect.
For example, in the trucking industry a special rule applies if substantially all of
the contributions required to be made to a plan are made by employers primarily
engaged in the long and short-haul trucking industry, the household goods moving
industry, or the public warehousing industry. See 29 U.S.C. § 1383(d)(2) (1982).
"Substantially all" has been defined by the PBGC to mean that 85%o of the plan
participants must be in the trucking industry. Stabilization Act, supra note 2, at
62 (statement of Howard W. Ryder, President, Coastal Tank Lines, Inc., Vice
Chmn. of the Bd. of the Associated Trucking Association). Unfortunately, the
trucking industry's major plans are not structured this way. Id. Moreover, the
deregulation of the trucking industry in 1980 has caused a lot of business failures,
id. at 227 (statement of Theodore R. Groom, Esq., on behalf of the Western
Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund), and it is tragic that this industry
has such a meaningless exemption.
140. See 29 U.S.C. § 1383(a) (1982).
141. 29 U.S.C. § 1398(l)(A)-(B) (1982).
142. Id.
143. 29 U.S.C. § 1398(2) (1982).
144. 29 U.S.C. § 1385 (1982). The 70% contribution decline test concentrates
on the number of "contribution base units." 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301(a)(1 1), 1385 (1982).
There are two crucial time periods associated with this test. First, there is a "3-
year testing period," see 29 U.S.C. § 1385(b)(l)(B)(i) (1982), which is defined as
the plan year involved in the determination and the two plan years immediately
preceding it. Id. Second, there is the 5 plan years immediately preceding the
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contribute;' 41 or (3) a cessation of an obligation to contribute at a
facility. 146
The permanent closing of a plant may trigger partial withdrawal
liability under either the seventy percent contribution decline rule
or the cessation of an obligation to contribute rule. 47 If all of the
facilities are covered by one agreement and one of the facilities is
closed, it is quite possible that partial withdrawal liability may be
aforementioned 3-year testing period. 29 U.S.C. § 1385(b)(l)(B)(ii) (1982). It is
from this 5 year period that the "high base year," is calculated. Id. The high
base year is derived by taking the two plan years with the highest contribution
base units during this 5 year period and averaging them. Id. In making the partial
withdrawal liability calculations it may be necessary to determine the employer's
contribution base units for a plan ending prior to April 29, 1980 (the effective
date of the MPPAA). A special rule has been enacted to cover this situation. The
rule provides that the employer's contribution base units for any plan year ending
before such date are to be treated as being equal to its contribution base units
for the last plan year ending before such date. Pub. L. No. 96-364, § 108(d), 94
Stat. 1267, 1269, amended by 98 Stat. 899.
The 70076 test is satisfied if: "[t]here is a 700o contribution decline for any plan
year if during each plan year in the 3-year testing period the employer's contribution
base units do not exceed 3007o of the employer's contribution base units for the
high base year." 29 U.S.C. § 1385(b)(l)(A) (1982). The 70% test does not apply
to plan years beginning before April 29, 1982. Pub. L. No. 96-364 § 108(d), 94
Stat. 1267, 1269, amended by 98 Stat. 899.
145. 29 U.S.C. § 1385 (1982). The second way in which partial withdrawal
liability may be incurred is via a partial cessation of the obligation to contribute.
In order for this provision to apply, the employer's obligation to contribute must
cease under one or more (but not all of its) collective bargaining agreements. 29
U.S.C. § 1385(b)(2)(A) (1982). Moreover, the employer must continue to perform
work of the type which previously required contributions in the jurisdiction of the
collective bargaining agreement or transfer this business to another location for
partial withdrawal liability to apply. Id. A cessation of an obligation to contribute
to a plan is deemed not to have occurred if the employer has simply substituted
one agreement for another agreement requiring contributions to the same plan. 29
U.S.C. § 1385(b)(2)(B) (1982). This rule, which provides for partial withdrawal
liabilty upon cessation of an obligation to contribute, does not apply to any cessations
occurring before April 29, 1980 (the effective date of the MPPAA). Pub. L. No.
96-364, § 108(d), 94 Stat. 1267, 1269, amended by 98 Stat. 899.
146. 29 U.S.C. § 1385 (1982). The third way in which partial withdrawal liability
may be incurred is via a permanent cessation of an obligation to contribute at a
facility. 29 U.S.C. § 1385(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1982). A partial withdrawal can occur under
this provision only where there is a single plan and one or more collective bargaining
agreements covering more than one facility under the plan. See id. A partial
withdrawal will occur only if the obligation to contribute ceased at one or more,
but not all, of the facilities and work continued at the facility. Id. Thus, partial
withdrawal liability will not be triggered under this provision by the permanent
shutdown of a plant. This rule, which provides for partial withdrawal liability upon
cessation of an obligation to contribute at a facility, does not apply to any such
cessations occurring before April 29, 1980 (the effective date of the MPPAA). Pub.
L. No. 96-364, § 108(d), 94 Stat. 1267, 1269, amended by 98 Stat. 899.
147. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
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triggered under the seventy percent contribution decline rule. 4 The
other possibility arises when each facility is covered by a separate
collective bargaining agreement and a single plan, and the cessation
of the obligation to contribute occurs when the plant is closed. 4 9
If the employer continues to perform work at another location which
is under the jurisdiction of the collective bargaining agreement, the
cessation of the obligation to contribute rule will be violated.'5 0
c. Sale of Assets
Given the Title IV definitions of complete and partial withdrawal,
it is quite likely that a "bona fide, arm's-length sale of assets to
an unrelated party"' 5 ' by the employer will trigger some form of
withdrawal liability. For example, where an employer sells assets to
an unrelated party'52 and ceases covered operations, or when it ceases
to have an obligation to contribute to such operation, there is a
potential for liability.' Title IV, however, contains a provision
pertaining to the sales of assets, whereby complete or partial withdrawal
liability will not be triggered under certain conditions. 5 4
Title IV empowers the PBGC to issue rules and regulations which
148. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
150. In addition to these three general rules, there are also special rules which
apply to certain industries. A more restrictive partial withdrawal liability rule applies
to the retail food industry. 29 U.S.C. § 1385(c) (1982). Another special rule applies
to certain Great Lakes maritime industry employers. Pub. L. No. 96-364, § 108(c)(2),
94 Stat. 1267, 1268, amended by 98 Stat. 899.
151. 29 U.S.C. § 1384(a)(1) (1982).
152. 29 U.S.C. § 1384(d) (1982).
153. 29 U.S.C. § 1384(a) (1982).
154. A complete or partial withdrawal does not occur if the following three
conditions are met:
1. The purchaser must contribute to the plan substantially the same number of
contribution base units as the seller had prior to the sale. 29 U.S.C. § 1384(a)(1)(A)
(1982).
2. The purchaser must provide to the plan a cash or security bond for a time
period of five plan years beginning after the year of sale. 29 U.S.C. § 1384(a)(l)(B)
(1982). This bond must be in an amount whichever is the greater of either the
seller's average required annual contribution to the plan over the three preceding
plan years preceding the year of sale or the annual contribution that the seller had
to make for the last plan year before the year of sale. Id. This bond protects the
plan for the five year plan year period following the year of the sale in case the
purchaser withdraws or fails to make required contributions. Id.
3. The asset's sales contract contains a provision whereby the seller is secondarily
liable if the purchaser withdraws, either completely or partially, during the five
year plan years following the year of sale and fails to pay its withdrawal liability.
29 U.S.C. § 1384(a)(1)(C) (1982).
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vary the above standards.'55 These standards would govern the trig-
gering of complete or partial withdrawal liability in sale of asset
situations. 6 The PBGC recently issued regulations dealing with bond/
escrow and sale-contract requirements.' 7 Moreover, Title IV contains
a separate provision which deals exclusively with the liability of the
purchaser. 5
E. Additional Liability Issues
In situations where the original employer has either ceased to exist
or is only secondarily liable'59 under a defined benefit plan, the
successor or purchaser is deemed primarily liable under Title IV. 60
Additional rules, outside of Title IV, apply to further ensure that
the plan is properly funded. Specifically, if the MEPP is deemed
qualified under the IRC, minimum funding standards are imposed
upon the MEPP. 61 Should an employer fail to meet these minimum
funding requirements, an excise tax may be imposed upon the em-
ployer. 62 As a result, any successor or purchaser should scrutinize
the funding policies of the acquired plan or plans before making
a commitment. In addition, any successor or purchaser should thor-
oughly review the plan or plans to determine if the acquired plan
or plans will cease to be qualified or if they contain any possible
qualification deficiencies. If a plan should cease to be qualified, the
successor or purchaser not only would suffer adverse tax conse-
quences but also would be liable to employees who suffered adverse
tax consequences as a result of disqualification.
V. Actuarial Assumptions and Judicial Review Under
ERISA as Refined by the MPPAA
In determining the total amount of unfunded vested benefits of
a plan, certain assumptions, such as interest and mortality, must be
made in order to ascertain the present value of the benefits. 63 As
155. 29 U.S.C. § 1384(c) (1982).
156. Id. (to date the PBGC has not issued any such standards).
157. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2643.10-.15 (1985); see supra note 154.
158. 29 U.S.C. § 1384(b) (1982).
159. 29 U.S.C. § 1384(a)(1)(C) (1982).
160. 29 U.S.C. § 1384(b) (1982).
161. I.R.C. § 412 (1985).
162. 1.R.C. § 4971 (1985).
163. Classic Coal Corp. v. UMW 1950 and 1974 Pension Plans, 5 EBC (BNA)
1449, 1450 (1984) (Nagle, Arb.); see supra notes 16, 51, 120.
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to these assumptions, 64 the terms of Title IV provide that disputes
over the determination of withdrawal liability must be reconciled by
arbitration.' 65 These determinations, made by the plan sponsor or
trustees, are "presumed correct unless the party contesting the de-
termination shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the
determination was either unreasonable or clearly erroneous. ' ' 66
Another provision, relating to unfunded vested plan benefits for
a particular year, is one of the key variables in withdrawal liability
formulas.'6 7 Upon completion of the arbitration proceedings, either
side may appeal to the appropriate United States' district court for
a review of the arbitrator's award. 6 The arbitrator's findings of
fact are presumed to be correct unless they are rebutted by "a clear
preponderance of the evidence." 69 Court enforcement of the arbitral
award is governed by the United States Arbitration Act, 70 which
authorizes only a limited review of arbitration awards.' 7' This lim-
itation on the power of the district court judge would be proper if
arbitration is not commenced on the unequal footing which normally
results from the presumption favoring the MEPP fund's withdrawal
liability assessment.
VI. Shortcomings of the Current Withdrawal Liability
System of Calculations
A. MPPAA when Juxtaposed with Voluntary Arbitration
Several reasons have been posited as to why the current system
of withdrawal liability calculation leads to inequitable results. First,
arbitration under the MPPAA differs in several ways from standard
164. 29 U.S.C. § 1393 (1982).
165. 29 U.S.C. § 1401 (1982).
166. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(3)(A) (1982); see supra note 19, for a reproduction of
this statute in full.
167. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(3)(B) (1982); see supra note 19 for a reproduction of
this statute in full.
168. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(b)(2) (1982); see supra note 19 for a reproduction of this
statute in full.
169. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(c) (1982); see supra note 19 for a reproduction of this
statute in full.
170. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1982). MPPAA refers to the Arbitration Act as "title 9."
29 U.S.C. § 1401(b)(3) (1982).
171. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953). The Court held that under
title 9 arbitrators need not provide a record of their proceedings or an explanation
of their reasons for an award. Id. at 436; see 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 10, 11(a)-(c) (1982).
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labor law arbitration.'72 Specifically, since arbitration is mandated
by the MPPAA, 73 the parties have not voluntarily agreed to resort
to arbitration. Usually, the arbitration of claims between private
parties results from voluntary agreements designed to resolve disputes
without resorting to the judicial system. 74 Moreover, the issues raised
in an arbitration proceeding under the MPPAA are often resolved
by factors outside of the expertise of the typical labor law arbi-
trator.'75 Since arbitration under the MPPAA usually results from
the total or partial cessation of an employer's obligation to contribute
to a MEPP, the goal under standard labor arbitrations "of promoting
stability and labor peace in the parties' relationship is [rendered]
nearly irrelevant." 17 6
B. MPPAA when Juxtaposed with Compulsory Arbitration
The MPPAA requires that an employer and the trustees of a
MEPP resolve any dispute concerning withdrawal liability through
arbitration.'77 Under the MPPAA, an employer who receives notice
that it is subject to withdrawal liability under a plan may ask the
plan's trustees to review any matter concerning the liability.,7 The
trustees of the plan must conduct such a review and notify the
employer of the bases for the findings in question.'79 At that point,
either party may initiate arbitration. 80 If neither party seeks arbi-
172. For a discussion of standard labor law arbitration, see generally M. DOMKE,
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (rev. ed. Wilner 1985); F. ELKOURI, E. ELKOURI, How
ARBITRATION WORKS (4th ed. 1985); 0. FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
IN LABOR ARBITRATION (2d ed. 1983); Bartlett, Employment Discrimination & Labor
Arbitrators: A Question of Competence, 85 W. VA. L. REV. 873, 874-98 (1983);
Smith, Arbitration and the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments: From the
Golden Age to the Age of Reason, 12 CAP. U.L. REV. 17, 18-20 (1982).
173. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1) (1982).
174. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 582 (1960) (arbitration is matter of contract and party cannot be required
to submit to arbitration any dispute he has not agreed to submit).
175. "The expertise needed in a MPPAA case is not that of one familiar with
the law of the shop, [the law the arbitrator is familiar with] but rather one familiar
with pension funding concepts and federal pension law in general." Smith &
Friedman, supra note 20, at 15, col.3.
176. Id.
177. 29 U.S.C. § 1401 (1982).
178. 29 U.S.C. § 1399(b)(2)(A) (1982). The employer must request such a review
within 90 days of the plan's notification. Id.
179. 29 U.S.C. § 1399(b)(2)(B) (1982).
180. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(l)(A) (1982). Arbitration must be requested within 60
days of the date the plan notified the employer of its basis for its findings, id.,
or within 120 days after the employer asked the plan to review its initial deter-
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tration, the withdrawal liability is due and owing, and the MEPP
may sue for collection in the appropriate state or federal court. 8'
The legislative history of the arbitration requirement is sparse. No
mention of arbitration appeared in the version of the MPPAA first
passed by the House of Representatives.' 82 The requirement was
included in the later Senate version.'83 The joint explanation of the
two Senate committees which proposed the bill stated simply that
disputes arising from an employer's challenge to a plan's determi-
nation of withdrawal liability were subject to compulsory arbitra-
tion. 84 This proposed arbitration provision was enacted without
change.' 85
Although arbitration of claims between private parties usually takes
place as a result of voluntary agreements to resolve disputes without
resorting to the judicial system, 8 6 some state and federal statutes
do compel arbitration of certain kinds of disputes. 87 The MPPAA
process, however, differs both in purpose and in operation from
mination, whichever is earlier. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a)(l)(A)-(B) (1982). The plan and
the employer may also jointly initiate arbitration within 180 days after the plan
made its first demand for payment of withdrawal liability. Id.
The American Arbitration Association and the International Foundation of Em-
ployee Benefit Plans have jointly issued rules for withdrawal liability arbitra-
tion. See [July-Dec.] PENS. REP. (BNA), No. 358, at R-3 (Sept. 7, 1981) (text of
Multiemployer Pension Plan Arbitration Rules).
181. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(b)(1) (1982). The amount is payable in installments over
a period of up to 20 years. Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 1399(c)(1)(B) (1982). The amount of
each annual installment is based on the employer's prior history of contributions
to the plan and will equal or exceed the highest annual amount the employer was
obligated to pay the plan during the ten years preceding the withdrawal. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1399(c)(I)(C)(i)(I)-(II) (1982). The employer's obligation to pay installments may
not exceed 20 years even if more than 20 years would be required to amortize the
entire amount of withdrawal liability. Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 1399(c)(l)(A)(i)-(ii) (1982).
182. See H.R. REP. No. 3904, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. H4137-
60 (daily ed. May 22, 1980) (text of bill as proposed by Committee on Ways and
Means as an amendment in the nature of a substitute, passed by House, May 22,
1980).
183. See S. 1076, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., § 104, 126 CONG. REC. S10,070, S10,073,
SI0,079 (daily ed. July 29, 1980) (text of arbitration requirement passed by Senate,
July 29, 1980).
184. See 126 CONG. REC. Sl0,111, S10,120 (daily ed. July 29, 1980) (joint
explanation of S. 1076 by Senate Finance Committee and Senate Committee on
Labor and Human Resources).
185. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1) (1984) with S. 1076, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 104, 126 CONG. REC. S10,070, S10,079 (daily ed. July 29, 1980) (text of arbitration
requirement passed by Senate, July 29, 1980).
186. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 582 (1960) ("arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be
required to submit to arbitration any dispute he has not agreed to submit").
187. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
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typical arbitration.'88 Comparing the MPPAA arbitration to such
other statutes demonstrates the ways in which the MPPAA breaks
new ground.8 9
188. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
189. For example, compulsory arbitration appears in the Railway Labor Act
(RLA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982). RLA mandates arbitration by the National
Railroad Adjustment Board of disputes between railroad employees and employers
which arise under agreements governing rates of "pay, rules, or working conditions."
45 U.S.C. § 153(First)(i) (1982). Judicial review of the Board's decisions is limited.
See 45 U.S.C. § 153(First)(q) (1982) (grounds for reversal by courts of National
Railroad Adjustment Board are: (1.) failure of the Board to comply with the
requirements of RLA; (2.) action by the Board beyond the scope of its jurisdiction;
and (3.) fraud or corruption).
RLA deals with labor disputes in private industry, 45 U.S.C. § 151a (1982); see,
Roberts v. Lehigh & N.E. Ry. Co., 211 F. Supp. 379, 382 (D.C. Pa.) (primary
purpose is "promotion of mutually advantageous labor-management climate, one
of fairness, harmony, and necessary degree of predictability"), aff'd, 323 F.2d 219
(3d Cir. 1963); American Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am.,
Intern., AFL-CIO, 202 F. Supp. 806, 810-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (purpose "is to
prevent employers and unions ... from engaging in acts which may adversely
affect the national economy, without first having used the means provided by law
for the adjustment of their disputes"), therefore, its provisions for compulsory
binding arbitration are a close analog to the arbitration provisions of MPPAA.
There are, however, notable differences. First, rail transportation uninterrupted by
labor strife, was the public interest Congress intended to protect by providing for
compulsory binding arbitration under RLA. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 36 (1957).
MPPAA's objective of assuring the retirement security of participants in MEPPs
is important, but it does not approach in magnitude the public concern with
maintaining the flow of commerce which Congress envisioned when it enacted the
RLA. California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 566 (1957) (Railway Labor Act is essentially
an instrument of industry wide government, having primary purpose of avoiding
"any interruption to commerce or to the operation of carrier engaged therein")
(quoting 45 U.S.C. § 151a); Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 339 U.S. 239
(1950) (same); see 45 U.S.C. § 151a (1982). In addition, arbitration under RLA
applies to employee grievances concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions
which Congress considered to be "minor" conflicts. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Sheehan,
439 U.S. 89, 94 (1978) (per curiam). By contrast, disputes about withdrawal liability
under MPPAA may involve millions of dollars; these sums may even exceed the
net worth of withdrawing employers. See Complaint for Plaintiff, American Trucking
Ass'ns, Inc. v. PBGC, No. J82-0061 (S.D. Miss. filed Feb. 4, 1982), summarized
in [Jan.-June] PENS. REP. (BNA), No. 380, AT 228 (Feb. 15, 1982) (many members
of American Trucking Association have received demands for payment of withdrawal
liabilities that approach or exceed their net worth); see also supra note 8 (case in
which withdrawal liability exceeded employer's net assets). It should be noted,
however, that disputes under RLA can in some instances involve substantial sums
of money. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 370 F.2d
833, 834 (10th Cir. 1966) (National Railroad Adjustment Board awarded employees
$472,000), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1018 (1967). Arbitration under MPPAA, therefore,
applies to claims of a different size and nature than those governed by the RLA,
and was mandated for a different purpose than was arbitration under the RLA.
See 29 U.S.C. § 151a (1982).
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C. Trustee Bias
An additional important characteristic of withdrawal liability de-
terminations is that they are not made by an impartial third party,
A second example of compulsory arbitration involves states which have turned
to compulsory arbitration statutes in order to promote out-of-court settlements in
small claims and medical malpractice cases. For instance, Pennsylvania authorizes
local trial courts to adopt rules requiring arbitration of civil matters in which the
amount in controversy is less than $10,000. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7361(a)-
(b) (Purdon Supp. 1982) (authorizing compulsory arbitration). In some counties,
the amount in controversy may be up to $20,000. Id. § 7361(b)(2)(i). Compulsory
arbitration may not apply, however, to matters involving title to real property. Id.
§ 7361(b)(1). California compels arbitration of many civil matters when the trial
court judge determines that the amount in controversy does not exceed $15,000.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1141.11 (West 1982). Superior courts with 10 or more
judges may compel arbitration of cases involving less than $15,000 at their option.
Id. Municipal courts may, with exceptions, compel arbitration of any civil action.
Id. § 1141.11(c); see also Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice
Crisis: Constitutional Implications, 55 TEX. L. REV. 759, 766-67 (1977) (many states
have adopted statutes requiring submission of all medical malpractice claims to
screening panel before suit is filed, to encourage settlement).
Submission of claims to arbitration, however, invariably is a prerequisite to,
rather than a substitute for, a de novo trial. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1141.20
(West 1982) (any party may elect to have a de novo trial both as to law and facts
following arbitration); 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 7361(d) (Purdon Supp. 1982)
(any party has right to appeal for trial de novo); cf. Redish, supra at 768 (screening
schemes for medical malpractice claims involves proceedings held prior to actual
trial; no state has adopted statute requiring binding arbitration). MPPAA differs
from state compulsory arbitration statutes in that it does not allow the parties a
de novo trial on appeal. See supra notes 163-71 and accompanying text (discussing
judicial review under MPPAA).
Some state and local statutes also require arbitration of disputes between public
employers and employees. Such statutes may provide for binding arbitration, see
City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teacher's Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387, 397-98 (1973)
(upholding state statute requiring binding arbitration of disputes between public
employers and employees involving working conditions, hours, and contract griev-
ances); City of Washington v. Police Dep't, 436 Pa. 168, 171-72, 259 A.2d 437,
439-40 (1969) (denying appeal of arbitral award under statute authorizing binding
arbitration of labor disputes between local governments and police and fire de-
partment employees); City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Assoc., 106
R.I. 109, 112-13, 256 A.2d 206, 208-09 (1969) (court upheld the principles of the
legislature's propriety of delegation of power to arbitrators under the Firefighters'
Arbitration Act which provided for, inter alia, binding arbitration); cf. Tremblay
v. Berlin Police Union, 108 N.H. 416, 237 A.2d 668, 672 (1968) (approval of
legislation permitting municipalities to contract for binding grievance arbitration),
or for limited judicial review of the arbitrator's decision, instead of a de novo
trial. See City of Detroit v. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, 408 Mich. 410, 480,
294 N.W.2d 68, 95 (1980) (judicial review of compulsory arbitration of police and
fire department disputes restricted to whether arbitration panel exceeded its juris-
diction, whether award supported by substantial evidence, and whether award
procured by fraud or other unlawful means), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 903 (1981).
Typically, their purpose is to avoid strikes that disrupt critical public services. See
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but by the trustees of the pension plan itself. The Labor Management
Relations Act requires equal representation of employees and con-
tributing employers on a pension plan's board of trustees.'90 Con-
sequently, the plan's trustees have a direct interest in collecting the
maximum possible withdrawal liability.19
This interest arises in three ways. First, the trustees have a natural
interest in increasing the plan's assets, so that the plan can remain
solvent and possibly increase benefits. 92 Moreover, the MPPAA
makes no provision for periodic adjustment of an employer's with-
drawal liability and permits reductions in only a few limited situ-
ations.'9 3 The trustees thus have a compelling incentive to set the
id. at 436 & n.4, 294 N.W.2d at 72-73 & n.4 (compulsory arbitration statutes
successful in averting strikes). See generally McAvoy, Binding Arbitration of Contract
Terms: A New Approach to the Resolution of Disputes in the Public Sector, 72
COLUM. L. REV. 1192 (1972) (describing various forms of binding arbitration in
public sector, costs and benefits). The arbitration requirement of MPPAA differs
from them in two respects. First, the pension plans and the employers are neither
local governments nor public employees, but private parties bound by a private
contractual relationship. See, e.g., Republic Indus. Inc. v. Teamsters Joint Council
No. 83, 718 F.2d 628, 632 n.l (4th Cir. 1983) ("[MEPPs] predominate in industries
typified by small employers, systems of shifting work sites and 'portability' of
employment, such as the construction, mining, entertainment, and motor carrier
industries"), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3553 (1984). Second, the public interest in
avoiding strikes by public servants differs in nature from the public interest in
assuring the viability of MEPPs. The former seeks to avoid the imminent disruption
of essential public services; the latter concerns only the allocation of the burden
of ensuring the economic well-being of employees covered by MEPPs. International
Teamsters Union Pension Plan, 5 EBC (BNA) 1193, 1199 (1984) (Mittelman, Arb.);
see PBGC Study, supra note 46, at 48. See generally MPPAA, supra note 9. Thus,
although these statutes, like MPPAA, replace the judicial forum with arbitration,
the public purposes they serve are significantly more compelling than those served
by MPPAA.
The differences between MPPAA, RLA and state arbitration statutes indicate
that the compulsory arbitration provisions of MPPAA are unique. Unlike state
statutes compelling arbitration of certain private claims, MPPAA provides for no
de novo trial of a pension plan's claim that an employer owes it withdrawal liability
payments. On the contrary, MPPAA requires a binding, nonjudicial procedure
for the resolution of a private dispute that differs in nature and magnitude from
the types of disputes federal and state legislatures have heretofore seen fit to compel
binding arbitration. See supra notes 166-74; infra notes 190-211 and accompanying
text.
190. See 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B) (1982) (authorizing employer-financed trust
funds for employees' benefits provided that employer and employees equally rep-
resented in administration of trust funds); see also supra notes 15, 29 & 34 and
accompanying text (discussion of board of trustees).
191. McCulloch, supra note 10, at 3-4; see supra note 43.
192. See supra note 191.
193. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1386 (adjustment for partial withdrawal), 1387 (reduction
or waiver of complete withdrawal liability), 1388 (reduction of partial withdrawal
liability) (1982).
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liability as high as possible to help protect against subsequent short-
falls in the event their predictions, which are based upon actuarial
assumptions, prove to have been too conservative.' 94 Second, trustees
who continue as contributing employers have an interest in avoiding
additional burdens on themselves. If an employer withdraws, and
does not pay his full share of unfunded vested benefits, then the
remaining employers will ultimately bear the cost themselves. 95 Third,
the employer trustees are usually members of the same industry as
the withdrawing employer 96 and, therefore, may well be the with-
drawing employer's direct competitor. To the extent that imposition
of large withdrawal liability damages the withdrawing employer's
financial status or puts him out of business, the employers remaining
in a MEPP will benefit from reduced competition. 97
Calculating the withdrawal liability in a manner that maximizes
the amount owed by a withdrawing employer would, moreover, be
consistent with the fiduciary duties imposed on the plan trustees by
ERISA. ERISA requires a plan trustee to "discharge his duties with
respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries ... for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to
participants and their beneficiaries .... "91 Furthermore, the trustees
face potential civil liability if they breach these statutorily imposed
fiduciary obligations. 99 The Supreme Court has made it clear that
194. See supra note 191.
195. Cummings, Pension Plan Act Weakens Employers' 'Community Interest,'
Nat'l L.J., Sept. 7, 1981, at 20; see supra note 191.
196. McCulloch, supra note 10, at 3; Interview with Kenneth J. McCulloch,
Partner, Townley & Updike, in New York City (Aug. 16, 1985); see infra note
227 (trustees and withdrawing employers involved in the withdrawal liability litigation
all were members of the same industry in each case).
197. See McCulloch, supra note 10, at 3-4.
198.
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in
the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administrating the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise
of a like character and with like aims. ...
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l) (fiduciary duties) (1982).
For a discussion of fiduciary duties under ERISA see Note, Fiduciary Standards
and the Prudent Man Rule under the Employment [sic] Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, 88 HARV. L. REv. 960 (1975).
199. 29 U.S.C. § 1451(a)(1) (civil actions) (1982):
A plan fiduciary, employer, plan participant, or beneficiary, who is
adversely affected by the act or omission of any party under th[e] subtitle
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ERISA requires a trustee appointed by an employer to overcome
his loyalty to the employer and instead solely represent the plan's
beneficiaries. 200 Thus, when the trustees representing plan beneficiaries
and those representing non-withdrawing employers make withdrawal
liability determinations, their interests are identical: each may benefit
from collection of as large a withdrawal liability as possible, and
neither owes a duty to the withdrawing employer.2 0'
Withdrawal liability determinations are made in such a way, there-
fore, that disputes between trustees of pension plans and employers
from whom they demand withdrawal liability payments are virtually
inevitable. The trustees of the pension plan have an interest in
maximizing withdrawal liability payments. 202 They may serve that
interest by manipulating both the flexibilty of the statutory provisions
governing a plan's determination of employer liability,0 3 and the
flexibility of the actuarial assumptions used in calculating the amount
of the liability.20 4 The interest of the departing employer is, of course,
to minimize or eliminate withdrawal liability payments. Consideration
of these opposing interests is crucial to the evaluation of the fairness
and propriety of MPPAA's procedures for resolving withdrawal
liability disputes.
D. Information Imbalances Under the MPPAA
Another important factor which distinguishes MPPAA arbitration
from standard labor law arbitration centers upon interpretation. In
the standard labor law arbitration proceeding, the arbitrator usually
examines the collective bargaining agreement entered into by the
parties. 205 From this document the arbitrator tries to ascertain the
intent of the respective parties. 20 6 Conversely, under a MPPAA
with respect to a multiemployer plan, or an employee organization which
represents such a plan participant or beneficiary for purposes of collective
bargaining, may bring an action for appropriate legal or equitable relief,
or both.
200. NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 334 (1981); see supra notes 43,
190-99 and accompanying text.
201. McCulloch, supra note 10, at 3-4; see supra note 200.
202. McCulloch, supra note 10, at 3-4; see infra note 227 (cases indicate that
as withdrawal liability assessment increases, the remaining liability of trustees de-
creases); supra note 43.
203. McCulloch, supra note 10, at 4; see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
204. McCulloch, supra note 10, at 4; see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
205. See Smith & Friedman, supra note 20, at 15, col. 3.
206. See Smith & Friedman, supra note 20, at 15, col. 2; A. Cox, D. BOK &
R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW, 518-20 (9th ed. 1981); Cox, Reflections Upon Labor
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arbitration, the arbitrator will be "construing the intent of a third
party: Congress. Thus, he must pay careful attention to how the
legislature intended the statute to operate, regardless of whether the
result reached was within the contemplation of either party to the
dispute."2 °7 Thus, questions of pure statutory interpretation are being
resolved by arbitrators. As a result of these differences, serious
doubts have been raised as to whether the use of arbitrators is
appropriate under the MPPAA.20 8
Another reason for the inequitability of the present system relates
to the information imbalance. Under the MPPAA, the pension fund
calculates withdrawal liability ex parte.2 0 9 As a result, an employer
will find it difficult, if not impossible, to respond effectively to a
withdrawal liability claim. 210 The withdrawal 'liability claim document
will rarely provide information sufficient to allow the employer to
deduce the way in which the liability assessment was derived.'
Furthermore, requests by employers for additional information re-
garding this liability calculation from the MEPPs are not responded
to. 212 Since these disputes are resolved by resort to arbitration, rather
than the courts, the discovery rules available in the latter forum are
Arbitration, 72 HiAv. L. REV. 1482, 1493, 1498-99 (1958). See generally supra
note 172 (discussion of standard labor law arbitration).
207. See Smith & Friedman, supra note 20, at 15, col. 3.
208. Id. at 15, 19-20.
209. Weinstein & Roach, Rule Can Address Withdrawal Cases' Power Imbalance,
Legal Times, Feb. 6, 1984, at 16, col. 1. [hereinafter cited as Weinstein & Roach];
see Obrentz & Woodward, supra note 5, at 70-72.
210. "Because the claim is calculated and assessed ex parte, the employer has
no knowledge of what data were used, what decisions and judgments were made,
and who made them." Weinstein & Roach, supra note 209, at 16, col. 1; see
Obrentz & Woodward, supra note 5, at 70-72.
211. Weinstein & Roach, supra note 209, at 16, col. 3; see Obrentz & Woodward,
supra note 5, at 70-72.
212. Stabilization Act, supra note 2, at 79, 90 (statements of Dennis L. Hansen,
Sec'y and Treas., Ramsey Winch Company); id. at 122-23 (statement of Laurence
S. Fordham, Attorney, on behalf of C & S Wholesale Grocers, Inc.) ("[tihe fact
of the matter is that the union has the information, but we cannot get it. We
have asked, . . . but they have refused to give it to us."); id. at 175 (statement
of Charles Naylor, Vice President, Labor Relations, Dubuque Packing Co., on
behalf of the American Meat Institute) ("[wie asked for several types of information
and received this response: 'It has further been determined, however, that the other
information requested would not be material or relevant to any review of the
accuracy of the withdrawal liability computation that you undertake, and is con-
fidential and privileged'."); id. at 232 (statement of Sen. Nickles, Chairman Sub-
comm. on Labor) ("[wie have had many people, particularly the employers, that
stated they could receive very little information concerning the status of plans.");
see supra note 211.
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not available to withdrawing employers." 3 In addition, regulations
proposed by PBGC on the arbitration of multiemployer plan disputes
are silent on the subject of discovery under arbitration proceedings. 24
Moreover, these proposed regulations have suggested that arbitration
proceedings should strive for quick resolution of disputes, and thereby
leave insufficient time for proper discovery. 215 The presence of the
evidentiary presumptions contained in the MPPAA, and the great
reliance upon actuarial assumptions216 in the calculation of withdrawal
liability highlight the need for complete disclosure.
E. Effect of MPPAA Presumptions
The effect of the MPPAA presumptions on withdrawal liability
calculations provides another inequity inherent in the present system.
MPPAA sets forth three requirements governing arbitration of dis-
putes over the withdrawal liability. First, the arbitration must be
conducted in accordance-with the fair and equitable procedures
promulgated by PBGC.21 7 Second, the arbitrator must presume that
the plan's determinations concerning the withdrawal liability are
correct, absent a showing by the employer, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that a challenged determination was "unreasonable or
clearly erroneous." 2 ' Third, the plan's calculations of its unfunded
vested benefits are presumed correct unless the employer shows, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that the actuarial assumptions used
213. Weinstein & Roach, supra note 209, at 16, col. 1; see FED. R. Civ. P. 26-
37; C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 539-601 (4th ed. 1983); Obrentz &
Woodward, supra note 5, at 70-72.
214. PBGC Proposed Regulations on Arbitration of Disputes in Multiemployer
Plans, 48 Fed. Reg. 31,251 (1983) (if adopted to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2643).
215. Id.
216. See supra notes 19, 163-69 and accompanying text; see also Weinstein &
Roach, supra note 209, at 18, col. 4.
217. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(2) (1982). The PBGC has proposed such procedures,
but to date they have not been adopted. See infra note 229; PBGC Proposes
Arbitration Rules for Plan Withdrawal Liability Disputes, [July-Dec.] PENS. REP.
(BNA), No. 452, at 1146 (July 11, 1983). For the interim period, the PBGC has
endorsed the arbitration proceedings of the American Arbitration Association. See
Republic Industries, Inc. v. Central Pa. Teamsters Pension Fund, 534 F. Supp.
1340, 1348 (E.D. Pa.) (order denying preliminary injunction), rev'd on other grounds,
693 F.2d 290 (3d Cir. 1982). MPPAA § 405 indicates that any reasonable action
taken during the period before regulations take effect shall be treated as complying
with the regulations. 29 U.S.C. § 1461 (1982). Thus, prior to adoption of final
regulations, § 405 of the MPPAA must be interpreted as entitling arbitrators to
rely upon their own judgment when finding actions to be reasonable. See id.
218. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(3)(A)-(B)(i) (1982); see supra note 217.
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in the calculation were, "in the aggregate, unreasonable (taking into
account the experience of the plan and reasonable expectations)." 2 9
The MPPAA presumptions have three effects. First, they place
the burden of proof on the employer.220 Second, they define the
standard of proof as "by a preponderance of the evidence," the
usual standard in civil cases. 21 Finally, they define what the employer
must prove to rebut the presumption: that the plan's determination
is unreasonable or clearly erroneous."22
These statutory presumptions transform the arbitration from a de
novo adjudication into a limited review of the pension plan's de-
terminations. In operation, this scheme places the pension plan in
the role of a jury, a trial judge, or an administrative agency, and
places the arbitrator in the role of an appellate judge.223 This unusual
219. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(3)(B)(i) (1982). The employer may also challenge the
plan's determination by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the plan's
actuary made a significant error in applying actuarial assumptions or methods. Id.;
29 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(3)(B)(ii) (1982); see supra note 217.
220. In a normal civil suit where a plaintiff seeks to collect a debt, common
law places the burden on the plaintiff to prove both the existence of and the
amount of the debt. Hoffman, Litigation Over Multiemployer Pension Plans, Nat'l
Law Journal, Sept. 24, 1984, at 20, col. 2.
221. See G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 41 (1978) (party
must prove elements of claim by preponderance of evidence in typical civil case).
222. See supra note 19.
223. "Clearly erroneous" is the language used to define the standard of federal
appellate review of a trial judge's findings of fact in a nonjury trial. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 52(a) (findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous). A
finding is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court "is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). The "clearly erroneous" standard does
not permit an appellate court to decide the facts de novo or to set aside findings
merely because the court itself would have reached a different result. Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969).
The "unreasonable" standard resembles the standard of judicial review in which
"reasonableness" is the principal criterion. Specifically, it resembles the standard
for judicial review of jury verdicts. A judge generally may overturn a jury verdict
only if, without considering the credibility of the witnesses or the weight of the
evidence, "there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable men
could have reached." Simblest v. Maynard, 427 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1970) (emphasis
added); see 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
2524, at 545-46 (1971) (citing numerous cases phrasing test for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict in terms of what reasonable men could do).
Although the meaning of the terms "reasonable" and "clearly erroneous" may
vary depending on the cases to which they are applied, both have a common
underlying purpose: to grant some degree of deference to the entity that first
decides a matter. Appellate courts defer to a trial judge's findings of fact because
of his firsthand familiarity with the testimony and evidence. See Mayor of Phil-
adelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 621 n.20 (1974) (citing
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 769-77 (1973)) (district judge with firsthand
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allocation of functions is suspect because the plan and the interested
party possess none of the characteristics of juries, judges, or agencies
which justify deference to their findings.22 4
In creating these presumptions the House Education and Labor
Committee thought that placing the burden of proof on the employer
would prevent delay in the payment of the imposed withdrawal
liability to the pension plan.22 The actual effect of the presumptions
goes far beyond the Committee's intent to prevent the employer
from delaying payment through protracted litigation. The requirement
that the employer prove the unreasonableness of the plan's deter-
minations and actuarial assumptions prevents the arbitrator from
reaching an independent conclusion, as long as the determinations
of the plan's trustees are reasonable.22
6
A central issue in many withdrawal liability cases is whether the
MEPP's assumed interest rate, used to calculate the employer's
unfunded vested benefits (UVB), is reasonable.227 The employer usu-
ally views this assumption as most important.228 The MPPAA requires
knowledge of evidence more likely to understand its special significance than appellate
judge having only printed page to examine).
224. Deference to jury findings is based on traditional respect for the ability of
a panel of one's peers to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and to find the truth.
See Tennant v. Peoria & P.U. Ry., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944) (because function of
jury is to weigh evidence, judge credibilty of witnesses, and draw ultimate conclusion
as to facts, courts cannot set aside jury verdict because judges feel other results
more reasonable). Deference to an administrative agency's findings of fact arises
from respect for the agency's superior expertise in the matters at issue. See Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951) (findings of agencies equipped
by experience to deal with specialized field of knowledge carry authority that courts
must respect). Agency expertise and respect for congressional delegation of authority
to agencies justify judicial deference to an agency's construction of statutory terms
in specific cases. Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 411-12 (1941).
225. H.R. REP. No. 869, Part I, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 52, 86, reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2918, 2954. As reported by the House Committee,
MPPAA did not include an arbitration requirement; the presumptions applied to
judicial review of the pension plan's determinations. Id. When the Senate added
an arbitration requirement, the presumptions were retained. Id.
226. See infra note 238 and accompanying text (trustees' determinations held to
be reasonable although extremely conservative); McCulloch, supra note 10, at 3-4.
227. Buy-Low, Inc., 5 EBC (BNA) 2641 (1984) (Bowles, Arb.); Palmer Coking
Coal Co., 5 EBC (BNA) 2369 (1984) (Gordon, Arb.); Calvert and Youngblood
Coal Co., 5 EBC (BNA) 2361 (1984) (Polak, Arb.); Classic Coal Corp. v. UMW
1950 and 1974 Pension Plans, 5 EBC (BNA) 1449 (1984) (Nagle, Arb.); Ells, 5
EBC (BNA) 1161 (1984) (Zimring, Arb.); Joy Mfg. Co., 5 EBC (BNA) 1129 (1984)
(Hannan, Arb.); Perkins Trucking Co., 4 EBC (BNA) 1489 (1983) (O'Loughlin,
Arb.); Hertz Corp., 4 EBC (BNA) 1367 (1983) (Mittelman, Arb.); Woodward Sand
Co., 3 EBC (BNA) 2351 (1982) (Kaufman, Arb.); Penn Textile Corp., 3 EBC
(BNA) 1609 (1982) (Pritzker, Arb.).
228. Ells, 5 EBC (BNA) 1161, 1176 (Zimring, Arb.) ("the interest rate assumption
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
that the plan trustees, in calculating the UVB, use actuarial as-
sumptions and methods that "in the aggregate are reasonable" and
"in combination offer the actuary's best estimate of anticipated
experience under the plan . . "29 Unfortunately, setting actuarial
assumptions is an art as much as a science; it involves the application
of past experience to the future. 3" Forecasts of future wage and
interest rates are particularly uncertain given the wide fluctuations
these rates have undergone in recent years.23" ' Yet, even small dif-
ferences in certain assumptions can dramatically affect the actuary's
calculations. 32 For example, a slight variation in the interest rate
assumed for the determination of UVB often can mean the difference
between liabilty and no liability z.2 1 In one case, a decrease of three
and a quarter percentage points in the interest rate assumptions used
by the trustees of a pension plan to calculate the UVB attributable
to a withdrawing employer, resulted in an increase of twenty-six
percent in the employer's withdrawal liability.23 4 In another case the
plan's interest rate assumption resulted in a withdrawal liability
assessment of $1,210,400.235 However, the employer's interest rate
... is probably the most important one as far as its impact on the amount of
withdrawal liability which is found to be due"); see Smith & Friedman, supra note
20, at 19, col. 1, col. 3.
229. 29 U.S.C. § 1393(a)(1) (1982). Plans may also use actuarial assumptions
set forth in PBGC regulations. Id.; § 1393(a)(2) (1982). The PBGC has proposed
regulations which to date have not been adopted; see supra notes 207, 209; Obrentz
& Woodward, supra note 5, at 27-28.
230. See Berin, Unfunded Liabilities and Private Pension Costs in the United
States, BENEFITS INT'L, April, 1979, at 14, 19 (describing actuarial assumptions
used in calculating pension fund liabilities).
231. See TOWNLEY & UPDIKE'S PERSONNEL PRACTICES NEWSLETTER 6 (March
1985) (available from Townley & Updike, 405 Lexington Ave., New York, N.Y.)
(rate of inflation varies in direct proportion with interest rate).
232. See Caflisch & Fay, Employer Withdrawal Liability Under the Multiemployer
Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, [Jan.-June] PENS. REP. (BNA), No. 379,
at 182, 188 (Feb. 8, 1982) (seemingly minor changes in single assumption such as
interest rate can produce substantial changes in withdrawal liability); Seifman &
Seno, The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980: Explanation,
Analysis, Recommendations, and Suggested Amendments to Multiemployer Plans,
[July-Dec.] PENS. REP. (BNA), No. 362, at 2, 8 (Special Supp. Oct. 5, 1981)
(utilization of actuarial assumptions can have dramatic impact on withdrawal li-
ability).
233. Stabilization Act, supra note 2, at 170 (statement of Jerry Freirich on behalf
of the National Meat Association) ("[diepending upon the interest assumptions
used by the [tirustees, the plan may have a greater or lesser UVB [unfunded vested
benefit][liability]. In some situations, the UVB [liability] may entirely disappear
when the trustees use a high interest [rate] assumption."); Smith & Friedman, supra
note 20, at 19, col. 2.
234. See Penn Textile Corp., 3 EBC (BNA) 1609, 1617 (1982) (Pritzker, Arb.)
(employer's withdrawal liability calculated to be $188,000 with six percent interest
rate assumption and $148,500 with nine and a quarter percent assumption).
235. Perkins Trucking Co., 4 EBC (BNA) 1489 (1983) (O'Loughlin, Arb.).
[Vol. XIV
1986] MPPAA WITHDRAWAL LIABILITY
assumption, based on a market rate of return assumption, resulted
in an assessment of only $300,000.236 This conflict has occurred in
other cases as well.237 Generally, the decisions in these cases have
gone against the employer.
231
This result is not surprising given the obstacle which an employer
must overcome. The arbitrator must find only that the assumption
is not unreasonable. 23 9 Unfortunately, a broad spectrum of interest
rate assumptions may be deemed reasonable.2 41 One arbitrator, in
deciding this issue, found the MEPP's assumption to be reasonable
even though "it might not be the most reasonable approach. To
hold such an approach to be unreasonable is tantamount to holding
that most fund actuaries are professionally unreasonable in their
duties as actuaries." ' 24' Thus, the MPPAA presumptions force the
arbitrator to affirm any reasonable determination of the plan. There-
fore, the employer will predictably be assessed the "reasonable"
determination that most favors the plan. 242 When this low standard,
upon which MEPP fund assessments are judged, is combined with
the MEPP fund's predilection for assessing conservative interest rates,
236. Id. at 1491.
237. See, e.g., Hertz Corp., 4 EBC (BNA) 1367 (1983) (Mittelman, Arb.); see
also supra note 227.
238. Buy-Low, Inc., 5 EBC (BNA) 2641 (1984) (Bowles, Arb.) (6076 interest rate
held reasonable); Palmer Coking Coal Co., 5 EBC (BNA) 2369 (1984) (Gordon,
Arb.) (5 1/2% interest rate held reasonable); Calvert and Youngblood Coal Co.,
5 EBC (BNA) 2361 (1984) (Polak, Arb.) (5 1/2% interest rate held reasonable);
Ells, 5 EBC (BNA) 1161 (1984) (Zimring, Arb.) (6% interest rate held reasonable);
Joy Mfg. Co., 5 EBC (BNA) 1129 (1984) (Hannon, Arb.) (6% interest rate held
reasonable); Hertz Corp., 4 EBC (BNA) 1367 (1983) (Mittelman, Arb.) (7% interest
rate held reasonable); Woodward Sand Co., 3 EBC (BNA) 2351 (1982) (Kaufman,
Arb.) (6 1/2% interest rate held reasonable); Penn Textile Corp., 3 EBC (BNA)
1609 (1982) (Pritzker, Arb.) (6% interest rate held reasonable).
239. See supra notes 19, 163-71 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 238; infra notes 241-42 and accompanying text.
241. Joy Mfg. Co., 5 EBC (BNA) 1129, 1135 (1984) (Hannan, Arb.); see Hertz
Corp., 4 EBC (BNA) 1367, 1391 (1981) (Mittelman, Arb.) ("I am not persuaded
that most actuaries in the United States are biased").
242. A 1982 decision by an arbitrator illustrates the impact of the presumption
that a plan's assumptions are reasonable. In Penn Textile Corp., 3 EBC (BNA)
1609 (1982) (Pritzker, Arb.), an arbitrator sustained a pension plan's use of an
assumption that the plan would earn interest of 6 percent on its assets. The arbitrator
found that the employer failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that
the 6 percent rate was unreasonable, despite the employer's arguments that insurance
carriers use 13 to 15 percent interest rate assumptions, that the rates used by PBGC
for single employer plans were 9.25 percent at the time, and that the pension
fund's actual return on investment was 10 percent for the four years prior to the
employer's withdrawal and currently was 8 percent. Id. at 1617-20, 1630. The use
of a higher interest rate assumption would have increased the valuation of the
plan's assets and therefore decreased the employer's withdrawal liability.
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it is clear that the current system works a grave injustice upon
withdrawing employers.
F. The Reasonableness of the Interest Rate Assumption Outside
of the MPPAA
As their assessments of withdrawal liability indicate, the trustees
of MEPPs can, and very frequently do, rely on assumptions.2 41 One
of these assumptions is that invested monies will produce income
at the rate of approximately six percent both now and in the foresee-
able future. 2 " This assumption has been sustained by arbitrators " and
courts,2" and has not drawn any reaction from Congress or the
federal agencies.27 This assumption would be offensive in other
contexts.2" Thus, the legitimacy of the six percent interest rate assump-
tion depends upon who has made the assumption. This assumption is
243. See supra notes 16, 19, 163-71 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 238.
245. See supra note 238.
246. See infra note 253 and accompanying text.
247. See generally Stabilization Act, supra note 2; Oversight, supra note 10
(congressional hearings held on problems associated with MEPPs).
248. The IRS has had a 13% interest rate on tax underpayments or overpayments
until July 1, 1985, when the annual interest rate was decreased to 1107o. Rev. Rul.
85-47, 1985-16 I.R.B. 10.
From April 1, 1985 to June 30, 1985 the rate of interest to be charged by
MEPPs on withdrawal liability payments overdue or in default, according to
regulations of the PBGC, was 10.500. PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) I 23,682H. From
July 1, 1985 to September 30, 1985 that rate was 1007o. Id.
Private employers that rely on 6% assumptions have been the target of
IRS threats that their defined benefit plans will be disqualified. Private
employers have been making 'excessive' contributions to their defined
benefit plans with pre-tax dollars. These monies generate interest and
the build up in that fund is tax free. When and if the company needs
money, it can buy annuities or otherwise assure that the defined benefits
will be paid. The excess is then recaptured by the company. One of the
methods used by private employers to justify these excessive annual
contributions is to rely on a 6076 interest rate assumption. Congress has
found this offensive and is considering legislation to prevent or limit
such reversions. IRS has found this offensive because it reduces current
tax revenues. It has instituted a program to review plans, starting in
California, and as part of that program employers are being required
to justify the 6% assumptions. IRS contends that fully secure long term
federal government money instruments are guaranteeing a return of at
least 1007 and, for that reason, a 6% interest rate assumption by private
employers is not justified and is merely an illegal tax avoidance scheme.
McCulloch, supra note 10, at 7-8; cf. Foltz v. U.S. News & World Report, 760
F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (employee stock ownership plans face similar conse-
quences); 1 TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT (P-H) No. 11, at 7-8 (same).
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suspect when it causes the government revenues to be reduced, yet
reasonable when the effect is to increase employer withdrawal as-
sessments.
VII. Constitutionality of the MPPAA
The constitutional guarantee of due process2 49 requires that an
individual receive an opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner""25 " before government action deprives
him of property. Under the dispute resolution process of the MPPAA,
deprivation of an employer's property occurs when the employer
complies, under threat of penalty as required by law, with an
arbitrator's decision requiring him to make payments under the
imposed withdrawal liability. 25 Although it is well settled that "due
process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands, ' 25 2 the MPPAA's dispute resolution
249. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
250. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v.
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
251. MPPAA requires an employer to make payments in accordance with the
arbitrator's award, or face substantial penalties. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1401(d), 1132(g)(2)
(1984). Arbitral awards are enforced by the United States district courts. See supra
notes 19, 163-65 & 168 and accompanying text.
MPPAA's mandate of employer compliance with the arbitrator's award constitutes
public action for purposes of application of constitutional due process safeguards.
The United States Supreme Court described the limitations of such public action
in Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978). In Flagg the (court refused
to apply fourteenth amendment due process protection to creditor's self help remedies
authorized by New York statute). The MPPAA dispute resolution scheme differs
from the statute upheld in Flagg in three respects. First, the New York statute
provided only one of several means available to creditors and debtors to resolve
their private disputes. 436 U.S. at 160. The Court found there was no state action
in part because settlement of creditor-debtor disputes was not an exclusive public
function. Flagg, 436 U.S. at 161-62. By contrast, MPPAA mandates arbitration
as the sole means of settling withdrawal disputes; it is an exclusive public function.
Second, the New York statute merely authorized a particular creditor's remedy.
Id. at 164-65. Because the state did not compel the creditor's act, the state was
not responsible. Flagg, 436 U.S. at 164-65. The MPPAA, on the other hand,
compels arbitration and subsequent judicial enforcement of the arbitral award.
Third, the dispute between the warehouseman and debtor in Flagg was "purely
private." Id. at 160. Withdrawal liability disputes are not purely private; in fact,
they would not exist were it not for the MPPAA's imposition of withdrawal liability
on employers. These differences place deprivation of employers' property under
MPPAA well within the penumbra of state action subject to due process protections.
See generally Comment, Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, The Public Function
Doctrine in Retreat, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 637 (1979) (discussing impact
of Flagg Brothers).
252. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 334 (1976) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
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procedure is unprecedented in its combination of compulsory ar-
bitration, arbitrable presumptions, and limited scope of judicial re-
view.
Employers who have brought suit in cases which attack the MPPAA
on the ground that it deprives employers of procedural due process,
have focused their attack upon the presumptions relating to the
determination of withdrawal liabilty.2"3 In one case the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, discussing the application of procedural
due process standards to economic legislation, stated:
[i]t is by now well established that legislative Acts adjusting the
burdens and benefits of economic life come to the Court with a
presumption of constitutionality, and that the burden is on one
complaining of a due process violation to establish that the leg-
islature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way."'
Thus, arguments claiming that the MPPAA's presumptions are un-
constitutional receive rigorous scrutiny. Those Circuits of the Court
of Appeals which have considered this issue have all supported the
conclusion that the MPPAA's presumptions do not violate procedural
due process and are therefore constitutional." Given the fact that
economic legislation is at issue, this result is not surprising.
Vi11. A More Equitable Alternative
Congress stated that its purpose in including the presumptions
253. Keith Fulton & Sons, Inc. v. New England Teamsters and Trucking Industry
Pension Fund, Inc., 762 F.2d 1137, 1140 (1st Cir. 1985); Board of Trustees v.
Thompson Bldg. Materials, Inc., 749 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105
S.Ct. 2116 (1985); Textile Workers Pension Fund v. Standard Dye & Finishing
Co., 725 F.2d 843, 854-55 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, sub nom. Sibley, Lindsay &
Curr Co. v. Bakery, Confectionary & Tobacco Workers Int'l, 104 S. Ct. 3554
(1984); Washington Star Co. v. International Typographical Union Negotiated
Pension Plan, 729 F.2d 1502, 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Republic Indus., Inc. v.
Teamsters Joint Council No. 83, 718 F.2d 628, 640-41 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 3553 (1984); cf. Peick v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 539 F. Supp. 1025,
1047-49 (N.D. 111. 1982), aff'd, 724 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 3554 (1984) (appeals court upholds constitutionality of MPPAA without
expressly addressing the following specific issues: the role of the pension plan
trustees and the presumptions supporting their actions, although the district court
did consider the trustees' role); Terson Co. v. Bakery Drivers & Salesman Local
194, 739 F.2d 118, 121 (3rd Cir. 1984) (concluding generally that MPPAA does
not violate due process).
254. Keith Fulton & Sons, Inc. v. New England Teamsters and Trucking Industry
Pension Fund, Inc., 762 F.2d 1137, 1140 (1st Cir. 1985); see, e.g., Usery v. Turner
Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726
(1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
255. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
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was to "ensure the enforceability of employer liability.12 6 It is
indisputable this was a rational goal for Congress to pursue. How-
ever, this goal could have been achieved without giving the MEPP
fund trustees an amount of power, so great as to allow them to
control the final outcome of the litigation.117 Thus, it has been clear
to unions, employers and employees for quite some time that the
present system of withdrawal liability calculation is in desperate need
of reform." Congress, too, has begun to recognize the gross ine-
quities associated with the current system. Many Senators have echoed
Senator Hatch's views' s9 on the MPPAA, calling for reform in this
area. 61 Moreover, Congress has realized that the final responsibility
for reforming such plans does not rest with the court. 61
The frequency of litigation over withdrawal liability assessments2 62
and the dollar amounts involved 263 are perhaps the most salient
indicators of the need for either reform or repeal in this area.
Specifically, it is very difficult for a withdrawing employer to overturn
a withdrawal liability assessment, either by arbitration or in court.
264
Nevertheless, the frequency of such attempts has increased dramat-
ically. Recently, a survey of cases contained in a national labor
relations reporter indicated that the percentage of cases in which
MPPAA withdrawal liabilty assessments were at issue has increased
to approximately thirty percent of all reported cases.2 65
The reasons litigation has increased dramatically in this area are
dollars and desperation.266 The dollars involved can be huge. A 1984
survey indicated that in that year alone over 100 million dollars in
withdrawal liability assessments were contested.2 67 Thus, a change in
256. H.R. REP. No. 889, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. Part 1 86, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2918, 2954.
257. Id.
258. See generally Oversight, supra note 10 (statements of various Senators,
lawyers, professors, employer associations, and employers about the adverse effects
of the MPPAA); Stabilization Act, supra note 2 (same).
259. See supra note 2.
260. See Oversight, supra note 10, at 315-21, 330-35 (statements of Sens. Nickles,
Kennedy, Matsunaga, Cohen, Quayle, and Riegle).
261. Stabilization Act, supra note 2, at 2 (statement of Sen. Nickles, Chairman
Subcomm. on Labor).
262. See infra note 265 and accompanying text.
263. See infra notes 267-68 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 19, 163-71, 238, 253 and accompanying text.
265. McCulloch, supra note 10, at 5; Interview with Kenneth J. McCulloch,
Partner, Townley & Updike, in New York City (Aug. 16, 1985). This survey was
based on the cases reported by the Bureau of National Affairs in its Employee
Benefit Cases service.
266. See infra notes 267-70 and accompanying text.
267. Interview with Kenneth J. McCulloch, Partner, Townley & Updike, in New
York City (Feb. 15, 1985); McCulloch, supra note 10, at 5.
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the projected income rates of invested monies can mean hundreds
of thousands, if not millions, in the withdrawal liability assessment.
2x
The desperation arises because the employer generally has no al-
ternative. It cannot reverse the situation which gave rise to withdrawal
liability assessment.2 69 Once the employer is at the withdrawal liability
stage, it is too late to do anything but fight against that assessment
through litigation.170
Due to the prominent role the pension system has assumed in the
lives of many Americans,' 7 any change in the current system would
have to occur by way of reform rather than repeal of the current
system. In short, the concept envisioned by the MPPAA could be
better accomplished by letting private insurance companies assume
the withdrawing employer's liability. The proposal which follows
would reform the pension law while keeping most of the present
system intact.
Assume ABC Co. withdraws from a MEPP. The amount of the
fund assets attributable to ABC Co., as of the time of the withdrawal,
is one million dollars. ABC Co. is assessed with a withdrawal liability
award of two million dollars, payable over two years.
Under this proposal, government approved insurers would be al-
lowed to submit bids to ABC Co. indicating how much they will
charge to assume the responsibilities owed by ABC Co. to the fund.
To prepare their bids, these insurers would receive from the fund
certified records indicating the plan participants and beneficiaries,
obligations due, ages, etc.-in short, all the data the fund used to
prepare its withdrawal liability assessment for ABC Co. In preparing
these bids, these insurers will know that if they prevail as the
268. Id.
The best way to appreciate the significance of the dollar amounts involved
because of the assumptions made by the trustees of multiemployer pension
funds is by an illustration.
If $1 million is invested in 1985, and the assumption is that it will
produce income at the rate of 60o, compounded monthly, then at the
end of 10 years that $1 million will have grown to $1,819,317. At the
end of 20 years it would have grown to $3,310,204. If all other assumptions
remain but an 11%70 interst rate is assumed, then at the end of 10 years
that $1 million would have grown to $3,140,947 and at the end of 20
years it would have grown to $9,865,555.
McCulloch, supra note 10, at 6; see supra notes 8, 256-61 and accompanying
text.
269. McCulloch, supra note 10, at 5; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1341(a), 1362-64 (1982).
270. Id. Interview with Kenneth J. McCulloch, Partner, Townley & Updike, in
New York City (Aug. 16, 1985).
271. See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text; Williams, supra note 44,
at 1, col. 4.
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successful bidder to ABC Co., the one million dollars already in the
fund and attributable to ABC Co. will thereafter be theirs to invest to
meet the obligations that the insurer is assuming. The insurers will
also know that the benefit level that they are assuming will not
thereafter be changed by the fund without their approval. Finally,
the insurers will know that they do not have to produce any "up-
front" dollars. All they will have to do is, in effect, provide annuities
of a certain level to plan participants and beneficiaries in the future.
Based on all the assumptions, an insurer might offer ABC Co.
a price of $1.2 million to assume its withdrawal obligations. Fur-
thermore, the insurer may allow ABC Co. a long time period to
pay this $1.2 million. It can take collateral from ABC Co. In other
words, it can treat this business deal just like any other business
venture. This alternative procedure could benefit every legitimate
interest.
A primary goal of pension plan law is to assure that people will
have 'a pension upon retirement.172 Therefore, these insurers, who
would be bidding competitively for an employer's withdrawal liability,
would need to be governed by standards which would guarantee
that the insurer can pay the future liabilities. This result could be
achieved in one of three ways: (1) the PBGC could use insurance
companies' premiums to establish a reserve fund on every obligation.
In effect, this would put the federal government behind every ob-
ligation*as a secondary insurer. Thus, in regard to this function,
the PBGC would function like the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration,27 or the Securities Investors Protection Corporation; 274 (2)
Congress could set up standards and establish a separate commis-
sion to oversee the insurance companies; or (3) The matter of super-
vision could be handled under the mechanisms of existing state in-
surance commissions. 2" This method would provide a mechanism
for complete insurance coverage without cost to the federal govern-
ment., The likelihood that the. Pension Benefit Guaranty Board would
have to pay funds would be greatly reduced. More importantly, all
three of these methods would prevent any conflict from arising.2"6
The employees would benefit because they would know that at
least to some extent their benefits are guaranteed by private insurers
272. See supra notes 4, 64 and accompanying text.
273. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1831 (1982).
274. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-ll1 (1982).
275. N.Y. INs. LAW §§ 201-408, 1101-1116 (McKinney 1985) (organizational
purposes, procedures, and licensing requirements).
276. See supra notes 2, 10, 43, 172, 255 and accompanying text.
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and are not dependent upon the wisdom or integrity of the fund
trustees. The employees also would benefit in another way. They
would have available to them a yardstick by which they can measure
the performance of their fund trustees. If, year after year, their
fund is producing poor results, for example, it is producing only a six
percent increment on invested funds, either through poor investment
decisions, imprudent loans or excessive fees, these employees can com-
pare this performance to that of the private insurer who has taken
custody of the one million dollars attributable to ABC Co. If
the return generated by the insurers is better, the employees, or the
employees and the employers together, or the fund trustees on their
own initiative, may decide to let the private insurer make investment
decisions for the entire fund. The return generated by the private
insurers, to the extent that it exceeds the return generated by the
fund trustees, translates directly into more benefits for the employees,
and lesser contributions by the employers.
The withdrawing employer will also benefit under this proposed
alternative. The typical ABC Co. will be able to better negotiate
with the fund trustees about its withdrawal assessment. It will also
avoid litigation. If it cannot obtain a better price, or better terms,
the withdrawing employer will know that it is hopeless to litigate.
There are certain parties that have a vested interest in the existing
system, but to the extent they oppose this proposal, their opposition
would not be in the public interest. One such vested interest is the
present fund trustees. These persons, delegated by the remaining
employers or the union, will lose discretion to invest at least some
of the funds they presently are investing. Furthermore, if their
investment performance is poor, it will be more obvious to the
employers and the employees.
IX. Conclusion
The dispute resolution process prescribed by the MPPAA is un-
precedented in that it compels arbitration of a private dispute and
requires the arbitrator to defer to the findings of one party, while
denying either party the right to a trial de novo.7' Because withdrawal
liability determinations are imprecise, there may be any number of
reasonable answers to the questions whether an employer is liable,
and if so, for what amount.178 Yet, the statute insulates the deter-
minations of the trustees of the pension plan from full scrutiny,
277. See supra notes 19, 163-71, 217-26 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 230-42 and accompanying text.
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provided they are reasonable and not clearly erroneous, even if the
arbitrator or reviewing court considers other determinations more
reasonable. 2 9 This insulation results from the presumptions the ar-
bitrator must make concerning the correctness of the plan's deter-
minations and from the limited scope of judicial review provided
by the statute. 20
It is indisputable that there is great dissatisfaction associated with
the present system of withdrawal liability assessment. 2 ' The problems
associated with withdrawal liability assessment are caused by the
inequitable, unsound, and often irresponsible actions of plan trustees.2 82
Clearly, there is a pressing need for legislative reform in this area.
The present practice of placing blank checks in the hands of the
trustees must be stopped, and a new system of withdrawal liability
assessment should be instituted in accordance with the proposal set
forth in this Note.28 3
Addendum
On June 10, 1985, the United States Supreme Court noted probable
jurisdiction to review a ruling from the United States District Court
in Los Angeles, California, that rejected a broad attack on the 1980
MPPAA. 28 4 The Court, in this case, will consider the constitutionality
of the entire statute. 285 In addition, the Reagan Administration an-
nounced on January 20, 1986, that it was developing proposals
similar to those proposed in this Note,2 86 to reduce the role of the
federal government in insuring private pension benefits.2 87
Daniel A. Etna
279. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
280. Id.
281. See supra notes 2, 10 and accompanying text. See generally Stabilization
Act, supra note 2; Oversight, supra note 10.
282. See supra notes 43, 190-204 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 271-76 and accompanying text.
284. Woodward Sand Co. v. PBGC, No. 75 Civ. 2037 (D. Cal. 1975) (three
judge district court panel), prob. juris. noted, 105 S. Ct. 2699 (1985).
285. High Court to Weigh Pension-Liability Law, Engineering News-Record, June
20, 1985, at 153, col. 1.
286. See supra, notes 271-76 and accompanying text.
287. U.S. Seeks to Cut Role in Insuring Pension Benefits, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20,
1986, at Al, col. 6.
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